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Summary 
 
Soft power is a concept coined by Joseph Nye, referring to a country’s ability to 
co-opt rather than coerce other countries to achieve its policy aim. Culture, domestic 
political values and foreign policy are considered as a country’s soft power resources, 
while military and economic strength are considered as its hard power resources.  
 
As China’s hard power grows rapidly, its soft power attracts attentions and becomes a 
topic worthy of deeper exploration. While there has been a lot of descriptive evidence 
of the growth and potential of China’s soft power, how China’s soft power resources 
influence and contribute to a desirable outcome remains unclear. Do China’s soft 
power resources improve its national image? Is China’s image only determined by its 
hard power resources, or by its soft power resources, or both? What are the factors 
that influence China’s image? This thesis tries to answer these questions by examining 
the relationship between China’s soft power resources and China’s national image, 
controlling the impact of China’s hard power resources.  
 
After reviewing the literature, I operationalize China’s soft power resources as three 
categories: its culture, political values and foreign policy, and operationalize China’s 
hard power resources as military and economic strength. Foreign country’s impression 
of China is operationalized as China’s national image. The quantitative approach 
transfers the power resources and China’s image into measurable independent 
variables and dependent variables, by constructing a numerical indicator for each 
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variable using data from various sources, such as global public opinion polls, Chinese 
official statistics and yearbooks, well-known international organizations and databases, 
etc. With the independent and dependent variables, I build three regression models to 
test the relationship between China’s soft power resources and its national image. The 
regression result and the comparison of these three models indicate that China’s 
national image is influenced by both its hard power and soft power resources. China’s 
soft power resources do work to affect its image, although to a lesser degree 
compared to its hard power resources. Not all of the power resources could transfer to 
the expected outcome. “Tradition”, “Cultural products”, “Tourism”, “Military 
expenditure (relative)”, “% military expenditure in GDP” and “% trade with China in 
total trade” improve China’s image, while “Confucianism”, “Democracy”, “Highest 
MID”, “Dispute times”, “GDP (relative)”, “China’s import from the country”, 
“China’s export to the country” and “Export competition” impair China’s image. The 
findings suggest that proper handling of the historical factors, a reform towards a 
more democratic political system, promotion of its cultural products export and 
inbound tourism, more active participation in the international organizations, effective 
aid programs that benefit the people and subtle policy to deal with the impact of 
material power should be on the agenda for China’s image building. 
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
1-1 Background  
Soft power is a concept coined by Joseph Nye, referring to a country’s ability to 
co-opt rather than coerce others to achieve its goal. Culture, domestic values, and 
foreign policy come under soft power, while economic and military strength come 
under hard power. Nye raised this concept in order to rebut the argument that 
“America is falling”, believing that US soft power prevailed, and it was this soft 
power that maintained US hegemony in the world.  
 
China is viewed as a rising power in the world. It has obtained a high speed of 
economic growth and expanded its military expenditure. While China’s hard power 
grows, its soft power also attracts people’s attention. Chinese movies hit the 
international box offices with great success. The Chinese language is becoming 
increasingly popular abroad, with a growing number of Confucius Institutes 
established in 50 countries and regions. More and more foreign students and tourists 
choose China as their destination. Chinese cuisine, traditional medicine, martial art 
and even traditional clothes are today’s fashion. In 2008 the Olympic Games are 
going to be held in Beijing, China. 
 
China’s soft power is a hot topic in academic and non-academic circles. Responses to 
this “China heat” vary. Some argue that China’s rising soft power would be just 
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another “China threat” in the aspect of culture.1 Some consider soft power as a tool to 
supplement China’s rise, or to soften its aggressive image in terms of economic and 
military growth.2 Although the Chinese government has just started to use the term 
“soft power” in recent times3, the idea of cultural power is not new. In fact, the 
discourse of “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development”, “building a harmonious 
society and a peaceful world” seems to emphasize the “soft” side of the development 
rather than merely economic growth. Soft power topping could be used to manage 
China’s peaceful rise.4 Media reports also favor this phrase with a high frequency of 
usage, to some extent reflecting people’s interests. These discussions point to an 
interesting phenomenon, but also confuse us by different definitions and assessment 
of China’s soft power. 
 
1-2 Research Question 
Power can be analyzed in two aspects: its resources and its outcome. Do China’s soft 
power resources result in a desirable outcome? Do China’s soft power resources 
improve its national image? Does China’s “Charm Offensive” work?  While hard 
power is more obvious and easier to measure, soft power seems ambiguous, and 
                                                        
1 See for example, Joseph Nye, "The Rise of China's Soft Power," Wall Street Journal Asia, December 29 2005; 
Esther Pan, "China's Soft Seduction," Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10709/chinas_soft_seduction.html (Accessed 2006-10-1); John Derbyshire, "Soft 
Power, Soft Despotism," National Review Online, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/derbyshire/derbyshire200503160745.asp (Accessed 2006-10-1). 
2 Wanfa Zhang, "Tapping Soft Power: Managing China's 'Peaceful Rise' and the Implications for the World," in 
New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy, ed. Sujian Guo and Shiping Hua, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2007). 
3 In the address of the opening ceremony of a gathering of Chinese art and literature organizations by Hu Jintao in 
Nov.10 2006, the term “soft power” appears in the official setting for the first time. 
http://culture.people.com.cn/GB/22219/5026372.html (Accessed 2007-9-1). It also appears in Hu Jintao’s report 
at the 17th Party Congress. 
4 Zhang, "Tapping Soft Power: Managing China's 'Peaceful Rise' and the Implications for the World," 11. 
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depends very much on the context. Both the power holder and power receiver matter, 
and this complicates the method to assess soft power. However, it is worth trying to 
build indexes to measure the resources and outcomes of China’s soft power. Based on 
the previous research, this thesis aims to find out whether China’s soft power 
resources have a unique impact on China’s national image by controlling or 
“separating” the impact of its hard power resources. Furthermore, it tries to identify 
the factors that significantly influence China’s national image, in order to assess and 
compare their impacts, and provide some implications on China’s image building. 
 
1-3 Methodology 
This thesis applies both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The qualitative 
approach presents a description of China’s soft power, such as the “Charm Offensive” 
policy, soft power resources and constraints, the implications of the findings, etc. The 
quantitative approach is applied in two parts: the measurement of the variables and the 
design of regression models.  
 
To measure China’s soft power resources, I first specify and conceptualize each 
resource based on the literature review. Next I operationalize each resource by 
constructing a numerical index that serves as an indicator for each resource. The 
outcome of China’s soft power is operationalized as China’s national image. Data 
used in each index come from global public opinion polls, Chinese official statistics 
and yearbooks, well-know international organizations, such as the United Nations 
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(UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), etc.; well-acknowledged databases, such as 
the Polity IV project, the World Factbook from the United States Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), military expenditure database from the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), Militarized Dispute Data from Correlates of War (COW), 
etc.; relevant books and papers that help to quantify the variables.  
 
After operationalizing the resources into measurable variables, I build several 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to test the relationship between 
China’s soft power resources and its national image. By analyzing results from the 
regression models, we could find out whether China’s soft power resources have a 
unique impact on China’s national image, for the impact of China’s hard power 
resources is controlled or “separated”. Furthermore, we can examine and compare the 
impact of each resource by looking at the value and significance level of each 
independent variable in different models, in order to find out the factors that 
significantly influence China’s national image.   
 
1-4 Significance of the Topic 
1-4-1 Theoretical and Empirical Contribution 
This thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of China’s soft power, 
focusing on how China’s soft power resources influence China’s national image. In a 
broader sense, it adds some value to the discussion of power, a lasting but somewhat 
nebulous concept in IR theory, as this thesis analyzes power from two dimensions: its 
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resources and its outcome. Using China’s soft power as a case, it tries to find out the 
relationship between the resources and the outcome: whether resources can achieve 
the outcome, and how resources actually work to achieve the outcome.  
 
More specifically, this thesis studies China’s soft power that attracts attention from 
both the academic scholar and policy maker. Contending interpretations on China’s 
soft power influence develop from different definitions of China’s soft power, and 
draw different conclusions. This thesis tries to aggregate these different views of 
China’s soft power resources from the literature and operationalizes them into 
measurable independent variables. By regression analysis, it is expected to provide 
statistical evidence to assess these contending discussions on China’s soft power. 
Furthermore, based on the findings, this thesis discusses some policy implications that 
may be of value to policy makers, such as those dealing with public diplomacy. In the 
course of China’s peaceful development, a positive image around the world could 
minimize the fear and hostility from other countries, and thus create an international 
environment congenial to China’s development. This thesis may shed light on China’s 
image building as it tries to examine the factors that influence China’s national image.  
 
1-4-2 Methodological Contribution 
This thesis measures China’s soft power resource in a quantitative way. It is the first 
attempt to use regression models to assess the relationship between China’s soft 
power resource and its national image. The regression analysis can separate the 
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influence of China’s soft power resource and the influence of hard power resources, 
thus it is able to indicate whether China’s soft power resources do have a unique 
contribution to shape China’s national image, or whether China’s national image is 
shaped by its hard power alone. From a methodological perspective, this thesis serves 
as a supplement to the studies of China’s soft power in which the qualitative approach 
dominated the literature, and might inspire future research that applies a similar 
quantitative approach. 
 
1-5 Limitations of This Thesis 
1-5-1 Content Validity of the Measurement 
Compared to hard power which is more obvious and easier to measure, soft power 
seems ambiguous, and depends very much on the context. Both the power holder and 
power receiver matter, and this complicates the method to assess soft power. As a new 
attempt, this thesis tries to build an index or a numerical indicator for each soft power 
resource in order to quantify and measure this resource. However, not all the soft 
power resources are operationalized and included as independent variables in this 
thesis. The criteria of choosing the soft power resources as independent variables lie 
in: 
(1) Whether this resource is commonly acknowledged in the current literature. 
(2) Whether this resource is quantifiable, given the available data. 
 
Some soft power resources, or potential factors that could have an impact on China’s 
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image, are not included in this thesis as they fail to satisfy these two criteria 
mentioned above. For example, China’s development model, represented as “Beijing 
Consensus”5 is not included as it is not yet possible to judge whether a country 
follows China’s example. China’s media are expected to be a significant factor that 
could shape China’s image abroad. One possible measurement is to look at the 
audience rating or viewership data for CCTV, China’s official TV broadcast in each 
country. Unfortunately I could not obtain the data. Future studies could include more 
relevant independent variables to address the issue of content validity of the 
measurement, with a better design of the measurement and greater availability of the 
data. 
 
1-5-2 The Causal Relationship: One Way or Two Way? 
This thesis examines how the China’s soft power resources influence it national image, 
and does not take into account the reverse impact, i.e. how its image influences its soft 
power resources. For example, one hypothesis states that the attraction of China’s 
education, measured by the number of foreign students studying in China from a 
surveyed country could improve China’s image. More students coming to China from 
a given country results in a better image of China in this country. However, it is 
possible that a better image of China leads to an increase of foreign students coming 
to China from this country. China’s image becomes a cause that influences its soft 
power resources. In reality both scenarios may be true, and the causal relationship is 
                                                        
5 Joshua Cooper Ramo, "The Beijing Consensus," the Foreign Policy Centre, http://fpc.org.uk/publications/123 
(Accessed 2005-10-17). 
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two-way rather than one-way. This thesis only explores the one-way causal 
relationship, i.e. how China’s soft power resources influence its national image. The 
data for China’s soft power resources as the independent variables precede the data for 
China’s image as the dependent variable6. How China’s image influences its soft 
power resources or hard power resources is beyond the scope of this thesis, and could 
be a future topic for interested researchers.  
 
1-5-3 The Spill-over Effect 
This thesis argues that China’s soft power resources on a country (country A) will 
influence China’s image in this country (country A). However, it may be possible that 
China’s soft power resources on country A will influence China’s image in country B. 
For example, China’s foreign aid programme, one resource of China’s soft power may 
improve China’s image in both the aid receiving country and other countries that do 
not receive China’s aid. Chinese aid to Indonesia may improve China’s image in 
Korea, although Korea does not receive China’s aid. This “spill-over” effect 
complicates the measurement and seems difficult to deal with as we want to account 
for the different manifestations of China’s soft power in different countries, rather 
than assess China’s soft power in the world as a whole. Ignoring this spill-over effect 
induces some limitations but makes the quantitative measurement possible.  
 
 
                                                        
6 Except the pooled dataset. In Chapter 3 there are detail discussions on the causality issue. 
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1-6 Organization of the Chapters 
Chapter 1 raises the research question, and discusses the methodology, expected 
contribution and limitations of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the concept of power and reviews the literature on soft power 
theory by tracing its origin as a concept and its development in the Chinese discourse. 
Then it reviews the studies of China’s soft power, focusing on its soft power resources. 
After identifying the values and limitations of the current literature, I propose a 
quantitative approach this thesis applies, which may serve as a supplement to the 
qualitative literature on this topic.  
 
Chapter 3 deals with the first part of quantification: the measurement of the variables. 
It operationalizes each resource into a measurable independent variable, by 
constructing a numerical indicator for each resource, and operationalizes the outcome 
of soft power into China’s national image. Thus it transfers the power resources and 
outcome into measurable independent variables and dependent variables.  
 
Chapter 4 deals with the second part of the quantification: building and comparing the 
regression models. By analyzing results from the regression models, we could find out 
whether China’s soft power resources have a unique impact on China’s national image, 
by controlling or “separating” the impact of China’s hard power resources. Next, I 
examine each independent variable in order to find out the significant factors that 
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influence China’s national image.  
 
Chapter 5 is the conclusion of the thesis. It summarizes the findings of the previous 
chapters, and offers some policy implications for China’s image building.  
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Chapter 2  Literature Review 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on soft power theory and China’s soft power. First 
it reviews the concept of power, and traces the origin of “soft power” coined by 
Joseph Nye, followed by some critics and its development in the Chinese discourse. 
Next it reviews the studies of China’s soft power, a topic which attracts attention from 
both academic researchers and policy makers, focusing on the resources and the 
constraints of China’s soft power. By identifying the values and limitations of the 
current literature, I propose a quantitative approach that this thesis applies, which may 
serve as a supplement to the mainly qualitative literature on this topic. With the 
statistical technique, the quantitative approach could contribute to a better 
understanding of how China’s soft power resources influence its national image. 
 
2-1 The Concept of Power 
Before we examine soft power, we first look at the concept of power. According to 
Dahl, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do.”7 Bacharach and Baratz suggest a second face of power 
which is exercised covertly. “Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to 
creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practice that limit 
the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which 
are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is 
                                                        
7 Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power”, Behavioral Science, vol. 2 (1957), as cited in John Scott ed. Power: 
Critical Concepts, Vol I, (London: Routledge, 1994), 290. 
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prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in 
their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences.”8 Luke proposed a 
three dimensional view of power. “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a 
manner contrary to B’s interests.”9 A latent conflict of interest was highlighted as a 
critique to the first and second dimension of power. In the power relationship, the less 
powerful are not aware of their “real interests” because of their “false consciousness”. 
“A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but 
he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very 
wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have 
the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling 
their thoughts and desires?”10 
 
Power is also an important concept in the studies of international relations. “Despite 
the long tradition of power analysis in the international politics, scholarly agreement 
on the nature of power and its role in international relations is lacking.”11 The first 
approach, i.e. “the elements of national power” or “power-as-resources” approach 
depicts power as a possession or property of states. “The power of individual states 
was conceived to be susceptible of measurement by certain well-defined factors”, 
such as population, territory, wealth, armies and navies.12 It was challenged by the 
                                                        
8 Peter Bacharach and Morton S. Baratz, “The Two Faces of Power”, The American Political Science Review, 
Vol.56: 4 (Dec 1962), as cited in Scott ed. Power, Vol. II, 87. 
9 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, (London: Macmillan, 1974), 27.  
10 Ibid, 23. 
11 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter 
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons. (London: SAGE, 2002), 188. 
12 Ibid., 178. 
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“relational power” approach, which developed the idea of power as a type of 
causation. “This causal notion conceives of power as a relationship in which the 
behavior of actor A at least partially caused a change in the behavior of actor 
B…Power is an actual or potential relationship between two or more actors, rather 
than a property of any one of them.”13 
In fact, the traditional idea of power does have both material and non-material aspects. 
Michael Mann identified four sources of social power: ideology power, economic 
power, military power and political power.14 Dennis H. Wrong identified four distinct 
forms of power: force, manipulation, persuasion, and authority.15 Reinhold Niebuhr 
explained that political power “is a compound of which physical force, whether 
economic or military, is only one ingredient”. Many American scholars and politicians 
“do not fully appreciate that a proper regard for moral aspirations is a source of 
power”. In war, states rely on force, but in peace, they rely on “prestige”, i.e. not on 
“power” itself but on their carefully constructed “reputation for power”.16 Nicolas 
Spykman who specialized in geo-politics listed several elements of power: military 
forces, size of the territory, nature of the frontiers, size of the population, absence or 
presence of raw materials, economic and technological development, financial 
strength, ethnic homogeneity, effective social integration, political stability and 
national spirit.17 Raymond Aron proposed three fundamental elements of power: “first 
                                                        
13 Ibid., 178. 
14 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914, vol. 2, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
15 Dennis H. Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses. (New York: Harper and Row, 1979).  
16 Torbjörn L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory: An Introduction. (Manchester University 
Press: Manchester and New York, 1992), 225. 
17 Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power. (New    
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of all the space occupied by the political units; second the available materials and the 
techniques by which they can be transformed into weapons, the number of men and 
the art of transforming them into soldiers (or, again, the quantity and quality of 
implements and combatants); and last the collective capacity for action, which 
includes the organization of the army, the discipline of the combatants, the quality of 
the civil and military command, in war and in peace, and the solidarity of the citizens 
during the conflict in the face of good or bad luck….Milieu, resources, collective 
action, such are, from every evidence, whatever the century and whatever the forms 
of competition among political units, the determinants of power.” 18 Cline has evolved 
a formula for describing the elements of international power: PP = 
(C+E+M)×(S+W),  whereas PP
                                                                                                                                                              
 = Perceived power, C = Critical mass = population + 
territory, E = economic capability, M = military capability, S = strategic purpose, W= 
will to pursue national strategy.19  
Although many realist assumptions emphasize the primacy of material capabilities 
and define power in terms of its access to exogenously varying material resources,20 
attention to the non-material or intangible dimensions of power could be found in the 
realist literature. E. H. Carr considered military power, economic power and “mass 
opinion” as indivisible in the essence of power.21 Hans Morgenthau defined power as 
 
York: Harcourt, 1942), 19.  
18 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. Translated from the French by Richard 
Howard and Annett Baker Fox. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), 54. 
19 Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift, (Washington: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Georgetown University, 1975), 11. 
20 Sow Keat Tok, “Soft Power: A Re-Examination on the Quest for Legitimacy in a Globalised World”, (M.A. 
thesis, Australian National University, 2003), 28. 
21 E.H. Carr, The Twenty years crisis, 1919-1939: An introduction to the study of international relations, (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1964), 108. 
 14
“man’s control over the minds and actions of other men”, which derived from three 
sources: “the expectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages, the respect or love for 
men or institutions”, via “orders, threats, the authority or charisma of a man or of an 
office, or a combination of any of these.”22 He provided nine elements of national 
power: geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, 
population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, the quality 
of government23, with the latter four items as non-material or intangible dimensions 
of power.  
                                                       
 
Combining the “power-as-resources” approach and the “power-as-relation” approach 
in IR studies of power, I define power as the ability to tap the resources in order to 
cultivate the expected relations. Thus China’s soft power is defined as China’s ability 
to tap its non-material resources in order to cultivate a friendly relationship with other 
countries indicated by a positive Chinese image among the foreign public. 
 
2-2 Soft Power by Nye  
Although the traditional idea of power includes both material and non-material factors 
in international politics, Joseph Nye first coined the term “soft power” in his book 
Bound to lead24, and developed it in his subsequent series of articles25, essays as well 
as the other two important books on this concept: The Paradox of American Power: 
 
22 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (6th Edition, New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1985), 31. 
23 Ibid., 117-154. 
24 Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, (New York: Basic Books, 1990). 
25 Joseph Nye, "The Changing Nature of World Power," Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 2, summer (1990): 
177-192. Joseph Nye, "Soft Power," Foreign Policy, no. 80, Autumn (1990): 153-171. 
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Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone,26 and Soft Power: The Means to 
Success in World Politics27. As Nye defined it, soft power is “getting others to want 
the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them”.28 A country’s 
soft power rests on three resources: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to 
others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its 
foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).”29 On 
the other hand, hard power “can rest on inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”)”, 
and often refers to military and economic might.30 Nye used a power spectrum to 
illustrate the relationship between hard power and soft power, and used a form to 
compare them in terms of “behaviors”, “primary currencies” and “government 
policies”. 
 Table 2-1 Nye’s Spectrum on Power 
  Hard Soft 
Spectrum of 
Behaviors  
coercion inducement agenda setting attraction 
  
Command 
           
     Co-opt
Most Likely 
Resources  force payments institutions values   
  sanctions bribes  culture   
      policies   
Power 
 Source: Joseph Nye, (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 8. 
                                                        
26 Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). 
27 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 
28 Ibid., 5. 
29 Ibid., 11. 
30 Ibid., 5. 
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Table 2-2 Three Types of Power 
  Behaviors Primary Currencies Government Policies 
Military Power coercion threats coercive diplomacy 
  deterrence force war 
  protection   alliance 
Economic Power inducement payments aid 
  coercion sanctions bribes 
      sanctions 
Soft Power attraction values public diplomacy 
  agenda setting culture bilateral and  
    policies multilateral diplomacy
    institutions   
Source: Joseph S Nye, (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 31. 
 
As discussed above, the traditional idea of power does have both material and 
non-material aspects, although not termed as hard power and soft power. Classical 
realist theory on power covered both tangible and intangible levels. Neo-realists, 
however, seem to put too much emphasis on material power, especially military power. 
Nye’s soft power, which “reflects a continuation of the traditional concept of 
power”,31 attempts to draw attention to the neglected aspect. Furthermore, Nye argued 
that power had changed its nature in the information age, resulting in increasing 
political and social costs of using military force,32 thus the role of soft power deserved 
more attention. 
                                                        
31 Xiaoming Zhang, "An Analysis of Joseph Nye's "Soft Power" Concept," American Studies 19, no. 1, Spring 
(2005). (张小明：“约瑟夫·奈的‘软权力’思想分析”，《美国研究》2005 年第 1 期。) 
32 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 18. 
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Critiques of Nye’s conceptualization focus on the applicability of the US model. First, 
“Nye’s anatomy of soft power is based on US national strategic resources and 
strategic intention, leaving a vague boundary for this concept.” His analytical method 
aimed at empirical analysis rather than building an elegant theory. 33 Second, Nye 
failed to clarify the relation between hard power and soft power, and how to assess 
and measure the strength of soft power.34 Third, Nye paid too much emphasis on the 
power holder and too little emphasis on the power receiver. Creditability and 
legitimacy in the view of the power receiver should have been the core of soft power 
owned by the power holder. “While having legitimacy may entice others to follow suit, 
or allow one agent to shape the agenda, having the capacity to attract or the capacity 
to control the agenda may not necessarily confer legitimacy.”35 The US may be bound 
to lead due to its super power status, but the other countries may not be bound to 
follow. 36  In other words, the outcome of soft power, which should have been 
examined in a more detailed way, is different from the resource of soft power. 
Possessing the resources of power does not equal to achieving the outcome, for the 
resources will not necessarily lead to the desirable outcome. Further more, Nye 
proposed a concept rather than a theory, because there is no causal relationship 
discussed, and how the resources are related to the outcome is not clear.  
 
 
                                                        
33 Honghua Men, "Assessment Report on the Soft Power of China," International Review 86, no. 2 (2007): 19.  
(门洪华：“中国软实力评估报告(上)”，《国际观察》2007 年 02 期。) 
34 Zhang, "An Analysis of Joseph Nye's "Soft Power" Concept", 31-36. 
35 Tok, “Soft Power: A Re-Examination on the Quest for Legitimacy in a Globalised World”, 26. 
36 Sow Keat Tok, "Soft Power: A Re-Examination on the Quest for Legitimacy in a Globalised World", (M.A. 
thesis, Australian National University, 2003), 47. 
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2-3 Soft Power in the Chinese Discourse  
As early as 1993, Chinese scholars began to investigate the power of culture and soft 
power.37 With IR studies developing in China, research on soft power advances 
towards a comprehensive level. Usually they are combined with other relevant topics, 
such as “Beijing Consensus”38, “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development”39, public 
diplomacy40, etc. within the context of China’s reality. The current literature on 
China’s soft power written in Chinese falls into the following categories.  
z Introduction of soft power.  
Some textbooks of IR theory cover this new theory. Besides book reviews of Nye’s 
Bound to lead41 and Soft power42, journal articles present the background of this 
concept,43 Nye’s ideas of hard power and soft power,44 soft power’s components, 
                                                        
37 Huning Wang, "Soft Power: Culture as National Power" Fudan Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences) no. 3 
(1993): 91-96. (王沪宁：“作为国家实力的文化：软权力”， 《复旦学报(社会科学版) 》1993 年第 3 期。) 
38 Yuchen Wang, "Enlightment of 'Beijing Consensus' Enhance China's Soft Strength," Journal of Zhongnan 
University of Economics and Law, no. 1 (2005): 3-8.; (王雨辰：“略论‘北京共识’对提升中国软实力的启迪”，
《中南财经政法大学学报》2005 年 01 期；) Shan Yuan, "On Some Questions About 'Beijing Consensus'," 
Contemporary World and Socialism, no. 5 (2004): 17-21.(远山：“关于‘北京共识’研究的若干问题”，《当
代世界与社会主义》2004 年 05 期；) Jianjing Zhang, " 'Beijing Consensus' and the Rise of China's Soft Power," 
Contemporary World and Socialism, no. 5 (2004): 10-14.(张剑荆：“‘北京共识’与中国软实力的提升”，《当
代世界与社会主义》2004 年 05 期。) 
39 Xiaofeng Song, "Soft Power in China's Peaceful Rise," Lanzhou Journal, no. 3 (2005): 19-22.(宋效峰：“试析中
国和平崛起中的软权力因素”，《兰州学刊》2005 年 03 期)； Renwei Huang, "Domestic and International 
Environmental Constraint on China's Rise," Social Sciences, no. 2 (2003): 5-12. (黄仁伟：“论中国崛起的国内
外环境制约(下)”，《社会科学》2003 年 02 期。) 
40 Chao Huang and Kuizhong Zhang, Chao and Zhang Huang, Kuizhong, "China's Public Diplomacy," Journal of 
Aba Teachers College, no. 1 (2005): 50-52. (黄超，张魁中：“中国的公众外交”，《阿坝师范高等专科学校学
报》2005 年 01 期。) 
41 Zhongying Pang, "Soft Power in Internatioanal Relations: Review of Bound to Lead by Joseph Nye," Strategy 
and Management, no. 2 (1997): 49-59. (庞中英：“国际关系中的软力量及其它──评美国学者约瑟夫·奈
的《注定领导》”，《战略与管理》1997 年 02 期。) 
42 Wenjing Yang, "Reshaping American's Soft Power in Information Age: Review of Soft Power," Contemporary 
International Relations, no. 8 (2004): 61-62. (杨文静：“重塑信息时代美国的软权力——《软权力:在世界政
治中的成功之道》介评”，《现代国际关系》2004 年 08 期。) 
43 Haijuan Li, "Cultural Strategy in the Competition of 'Soft Power'," Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping 
Theories, no. 12 (2004): 49-54. (李海娟：“‘软权力’竞争背景下的文化战略”，《毛泽东邓小平理论研究》
2004 年 12 期。)   
44 Xianchao Deng, "On the Theory of 'Three-Dimensional Chess Board' and 'Soft Power'," Journal of Harbin 
University, no. 9 (2003): 28-30. (邓显超：“浅析‘三维棋局’论和软实力理论”，《哈尔滨学院学报》2003
年 09 期。) 
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characteristics, and the importance in empirical studies.45 Soft power serves as a 
non-military means to improve the image of a country.46 Ideology as a resource of soft 
power can influence foreign policy.47 To the US, soft power is a means to maintain 
hegemony in the world.48 In 2002, a conference discussing the role and influence of 
soft power in US foreign policy was held in Beijing.49 
z The resources of China’s soft power 
It is believed that China possesses many resources of soft power, such as “traditional 
culture, network of overseas Chinese, geographic strategic environment”50; “Maoism, 
China’s experience, the mode of gradual reform” 51 ; “respect of China’s 
achievement”52; “the vitality of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, the 
inspiring and attraction of Chinese culture and the international influence of the 
independence and self - reliant peace diplomacy”53; political ideology54; etc. 
                                                        
45  Ying He, Jixiang Zhou, and Mei Xiang,"On 'Soft Power' Theory," Journal of University of International 
Relations, no. 2 (2005): 5-8.(贺颖，周际翔，项玫：“浅析国家“软权力”理论”，《国际关系学院学报》，
2005 年 02 期)；Li, "Cultural Strategy in the Competition of 'Soft Power'." (李海娟：“‘软权力’竞争背景下
的文化战略”)；Renwei Huang, "Soft Power and National Security," Study Monthly, no. 1 (2003). (黄仁伟：“软
力量与国家安全”，《学习月刊》2003 年 01 期。) 
46 Xiaoming Li, "Image of Nation: Using the Non-Military Means to Maintain the External Influence," Pacific 
Journal, no. 4 (2002): 16-21. (李晓明：“国家形象与软权力——论运用非军事手段维持增进国家的对外影
响力”，《太平洋学报》2002 年 04 期。) 
47 Yue Xing, "The Role of Ideology in Foreign Policy," Pacific Journal, no. 9 (2004): 5-14.(邢悦：“意识形态在对
外政策中的作用”，《太平洋学报》2004 年 09 期。) 
48 Zhi Li, "American Cultural Diplomacy: Wielding Soft Power," Pacific Journal, no. 2 (2004): 64-69.(李智：“试
论美国的文化外交:软权力的运用”，《太平洋学报》2004 年 02 期)；Deng, "On the Theory of 
'Three-Dimensional Chess Board' and 'Soft Power'." (邓显超：“浅析‘三维棋局’论和软实力理论”)；Huan 
Li, "An Analysis of U.S. Soft Power," Journal of University of International Relations, no. 1 (2002): 23-28. (李
环：“浅析美国国家软力量”， 《国际关系学院学报》2002 年 01 期)； Shan Zhang, "Hegemony's Soft Power 
and Hard Power," Tribune of Social Science, no. 5-6 (1999): 4-8.(章杉：“霸权主义的软力量和硬力量”，《社
会科学论坛》1999 年 5~6 期。) 
49 Qiang Yong, "The Role and Influence of 'Soft Power' in U.S. Foreign Policy," International Studies, no. 6 
(2002): 59. (永强：“‘『软国力』在美国对外政策中的地位和影响’研讨会在京举行”，《国际问题研究》2002
年 06 期。) 
50 Yu Liu, "Soft Power in a Perspective of Globalization," Lanzhou Journal, no. 3 (2005): 13-18. (刘瑜：“全球化
视野下的软权力暨中国软权力探析”，《兰州学刊》2005 年 03 期。) 
51 Zhiyuang Xu, "China's Soft Power," Business Weekly, no. 4 (2004): 4. (许知远：“中国的软权力”，《商务周刊》
2004 年 04 期。) 
52 "China's 'Soft Power' Will Change the World," Shan Xi Finance and Tax, no. 2 (2004): 48. (“中国‘软实力’
将改变世界”，《山西财税》2004 年 02 期。) 
53 Zhan and Li Zhang, Haijun, "China's Soft Strength's Three Factors in the International Politics," The Journal of 
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z The current status of China’s soft power 
Although China’s soft power is increasing, it lags behind its the increase of hard 
power. There are big deficits in the trade of cultural products.55 
z The role and the importance of China’s soft power 
Soft power is important to China because it is a capital to be competitive.56 It can 
“improve China’s image”;57 facilitate “peaceful rise”;58 help to maximize China’s 
national interests59 and build a well-off society.60 
z How to increase China’s soft power 
China can increase its soft power by developing its cultural industry; exporting 
China’s cultural products;61 showcasing China’s unique culture, deepening economic 
                                                                                                                                                               
the Socialist College of Hebei Province, no. 3 (2003): 63-66. (张战，李海君：“论国际政治中的中国软实力三
要素”，《河北省社会主义学院学报》2003 年 03 期。) 
54 Jigang Ren and Peisheng Teng, "Research on the Strategy of Promoting Soft Strength by Use of the Second 
Track," Journal of Linyi Teachers' College, no. 2 (2005): 102-105. (任吉刚，滕培圣：“利用第二轨道提升软实
力策略研究”，《临沂师范学院学报》2005 年 02 期。) 
55 Wangshu Shen, "'Soft Power' Knocks at China's Door," Outlook, no. 7-8 (2005): 21-23. (沈望舒：“‘软实力’
叩响中国之门”，《瞭望》2005 年 2 月 21 日第 7-8 期。) 
56 Hong Ma, "Challenge of Soft Power after China Enters the Wto," Party Branch Construction, no. 3 (2002): 
38-41. (马宏：“中国‘入世’后面临的软力量挑战”，《支部建设》2002 年 03 期。) 
57 Xiaojuan Xie, "Shaping the Image of a Nation in Soft Power Theory," Theoretical Front, no. 19 (2004): 19-21. 
(谢晓娟：“论软权力中的国家形象及其塑造”，《理论前沿》2004 年 19 期)； Xin Fu, "A Nation's Image in 
the Age of Globalization: Considerations Upon China's Endeavor in Pursuing Peace and Development," 
International Studies, no. 4 (2004): 13-17. (傅新：“全球化时代的国家形象——兼对中国谋求和平发展的思
考”，《国际问题研究》2004年 04期)； Jinping Wu and Huizhi Luo, "State Image and Competition among China, 
America and Japan in Southeast Asia," Southeast Asian Studies, no. 3 (2004): 36-41. (吴金平，罗会知：“国家
形象与当代中美日在东南亚的竞争”，《东南亚研究》2004 年 03 期)； Paihua Fang and Kang Gao, "Shaping 
China's Cross-Century National Image," Journal of the Party School of Zhejing Province, no. 1 (1997): 68-73. 
(方柏华，高抗：“跨世纪中国形象的塑造”，《中共浙江省委党校学报》1997 年 01 期。) 
58 Song, "Soft Power in China's Peaceful Rise." (宋效峰：“试析中国和平崛起中的软权力因素”)；Fu, "A 
Nation's Image in the Age of Globalization: Considerations Upon China's Endeavor in Pursuing Peace and 
Development." (傅新：“全球化时代的国家形象——兼对中国谋求和平发展的思考”)； Zhang and Li, 
"China's Soft Strength's Three Factors in the International Politics." (张战，李海君：“论国际政治中的中国软
实力三要素”) 
59 Ji Qi and Dehuan Lu, " 'Soft Power' and the Realization of China's National Interests," Journal foe Party and 
Administrative Cadres, no. 3 (2004): 22-23. (祁迹，卢德焕：“‘软权力’与中国国家利益实现”，《党政干部
学刊》2004 年 03 期。) 
60 Baohua Li, "We Should Attach Importance to the Construction of 'Soft Power' in the Process of Building a 
Well-Off Society," Theoretical Front, no. 2 (2004): 28-29. (李葆华：“全面建设小康社会应重视‘软力量’
建设”《理论前沿》2004 年 02 期。) 
61 Jian Hua, " 'Going Out': The Way That Chinese Cultural Industry Must Go," Social Observation, no. 4 (2005): 
9-10. (花建：“‘走出去’：中国文化产业的必由之路”，《社会观察》2005 年 04 期。) 
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and political reforms, tapping human resources; 62  using second-track diplomacy 
(non-official, non-profit and issue-specific); 63  sticking to an independent and 
self-reliant peaceful foreign policy, increasing foreign aid, valuing talents and 
information technology;64 strengthening relations with international celebrities; and 
making use of NGOs and MNCs that function as a public relations company for 
China.65 
 
It is agreed that soft power is very important to a country. China possesses quite a few 
resources of soft power. Although it is increasing recently, China’s soft power is still 
lagging behind its hard power and other countries’ soft power. China should attach 
strategic importance to the construction of soft power.  
 
2-4 China’s Soft Power 
The previous section reviewed the origin of soft power as a concept and its discourse 
in China. This section focuses on China’s soft power, aiming to find out what China’s 
soft power refers to in the current literature. 
 
By studying the papers published by Chinese academic journals, Wang finds that soft 
                                                        
62 Xiujun Xu, "International Competition of Soft Power in the Post-Cold War World and China's 
Countermeasures," Journal of Guizhou Normal University (Social Science), no. 3 (2005): 40-43. (徐秀军：“后
冷战时代的国际软力量竞争与中国选择”，《贵州师范大学学报(社会科学版)》2005 年 03 期。) 
63 Ren and Teng, "Research on the Strategy of Promoting Soft Strength by Use of the Second Track." (任吉刚，滕
培圣：“利用第二轨道提升软实力策略研究”。) 
64 Li, "Image of Nation: Using the Non-Military Means to Maintain the External Influence." (李晓明：“国家形象
与软权力——论运用非军事手段维持增进国家的对外影响力”。) 
65 Ren and Teng, "Research on the Strategy of Promoting Soft Strength by Use of the Second Track." (任吉刚，滕
培圣：“利用第二轨道提升软实力策略研究”。) 
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power in the Chinese discourse can apply not only to nations, but also regions, 
organizations and even individuals. Regarding the resources of soft power, Chinese 
scholars seem to agree on the three resources identified by Nye, but the emphasis is 
different.66 Table 2-3 summarizes Wang’s findings. 
Table 2-3  A Comparison of Nye and Chinese Scholars on Soft Power Resources 
  Nye Chinese Scholars 
country America China 
culture contemporary American pop culture traditional Chinese culture 
domestic institutions 
and values 
political values, such 
as democracy and 
human rights 
the attraction of Chinese economic 
development model 
political 
recommendations 
improving America’s 
substance and style of 
foreign policy, 
especially the virtue of 
multilateralism 
emphasizing the domestic foundation 
of soft power, such as national 
coherence and government legitimacy 
Source: Hongying Wang, “Chinese Conception of Soft Power and Its Policy 
Implications”, 7-8. 
 
Studies on China’s soft power offer detailed descriptions of its soft power resources, 
such as traditional and popular culture, Chinese language, education, tourism, cuisine, 
economic development model, domestic policies under the new leadership, national 
coherence, peaceful foreign policy, participation in international organizations, public 
                                                        
66 Hongying Wang, "Chinese Conception of Soft Power and Its Policy Implications" (paper presented at the China 
Policy Institute International Conference on "China in the International Order: Integrating Views from 
Outside-In and Inside-Out", Nottingham, UK, 18-19 September 2006). 
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diplomacy and foreign aid.67  
 
After identifying culture, ideas, developmental model, international institution and 
international image as the core elements for China’s soft power, Men provides 
assessment for each component using historical and cross-national comparative 
approaches. 68 In his recent book Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is 
Transforming the World published in 2007, Kurlantzick provides detailed observations 
on China’s soft power manifestation, especially in Southeast Asia, based on his field 
work in these countries. His observations mostly comply with the resources discussed 
above, except that business, conventionally considered to be a resource of hard power, 
is categorized as a tool of soft power.69 Zhang agrees on adding “strong economy” to 
the resource of China’s soft power. Furthermore, he includes “Chinese diasporas in 
the region and their economic influence” and “benefits of sub-culture linkage” as the 
other resource of China’s soft power.70  
 
The constraint, or the resource that is lacking or insufficient in some sense, include: 
imbalance in soft-power resources, problems of legitimacy and incoherence in China’s 
                                                        
67 Yanzhong Huang and Sheng Ding, "Dragon's Underbelly: An Analysis of China's Soft Power," East Asia 23, no. 
4 (2006). ; Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'," Survival 148, no. 2, 
Summer (2006). ; Christopher Balding, "It's Not a Mcworld, It's a Dragon Buffet World: The Emergence of 
Chinese Soft Power" (paper presented at the 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 
San Diego, CA, U.S.A., March 22- 25 2006). ; Conrad Hässler, "Doraemon and Crouching Tiger - Examining 
China's and Japan's Soft Power Resources" (paper presented at the 47th Annual Convention of the International 
Studies Association, San Diego, CA, U.S.A., March 22- 25 2006). ; Hsin Chih Chen, "The Rising of Chinese 
Soft Power? Its Nature, Exercise and Implications" (paper presented at the 48th Annual Convention of 
International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, U.S.A., February 28- March 3 2007). 
68 Men, "Assessment Report on the Soft Power of China." 
69 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2007). 
70 Zhang, "Tapping Soft Power: Managing China's 'Peaceful Rise' and the Implications for the World." 
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foreign policy71; political system of authoritarian nature, failure of the international 
Communist movement, the Taiwan issue, historical burden of exporting Communism, 
conflict of interest with neighboring countries, and fear from western countries of a 
rising China.72 
 
2-5 Limitations of the Current Literature 
There are two points that we should pay attention to. First, most of the discussions 
focus mainly on China’s soft power in the world as a whole. They do not account for 
the different manifestation of China’s soft power in different countries. Not until 
recently do the studies on China’s soft power describe different scenarios in different 
countries, such as Huang and Ding (2006), Zhang (2007), and Kurlantzick (2007). 
Second, most of the studies on China’s soft power apply a qualitative approach that 
presents some evidence of China’s rising soft power73, or tells how China’s soft 
power may be hindered by certain factors. The relationship between China’s soft 
power resources and its outcome deserves further exploration. How effectively are 
these soft power resources being deployed? Do these resources significantly 
contribute to the desired outcome? Are some of them more important than others? Can 
China’s soft power resources work to shape China’s national image, or is China’s 
national image purely determined by its hard power resources? A qualitative 
description or approach seems insufficient to answer these questions.  
                                                        
71 Gill and Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'", 26-30.  
72 Zhang, "Tapping Soft Power: Managing China's 'Peaceful Rise' and the Implications for the World", 122-123. 
73 Although some figures and statistics are presented as evidence or index of China's soft power growth/resource, 
the relationship between resource and outcome is explored mainly in a qualitative way. 
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Although research on China’s soft power is mainly qualitative, there is some 
quantitative research on soft power of countries in general. It tries to quantify soft 
power by creating indexes for each resource, using data such as the export of cultural 
products, the number of foreign students, etc. Perceptions from cross-national public 
opinion data are used to quantify the result or the outcome of soft power.74 This thesis 
applies a similar quantitative approach, with additional variables that I consider 
important for China’s soft power resources.  
 
As stated above, the current literature mainly presents a general picture or provides 
detailed stories on China’s soft power but does not focus on the relationship between 
the resources and outcome of China’s soft power. It is not clear whether China’s soft 
power resources could result in a desirable outcome, as the qualitative and descriptive 
approach that the literature applies are inadequate to specify this relationship. To 
explore this unclear but interesting and important relationship between the resources 
and the outcome, this thesis applies a quantitative approach, building models that 
regress the outcome on the resources. Thus it could assess the effectiveness of China’s 
soft power by examining the relationship between China’s soft power resources and 
its outcome.  
 
Furthermore, a multiple regression in the quantitative approach has the value of 
                                                        
74 Allison Nau, "The Strength of a State: Modeling Hard and Soft Power " (paper presented at the 63rd Annual 
National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, U.S.A., April 7-10 2005).; 
Peter A. Furia, "Operationalizing Soft Power" (paper presented at the 64th Annual National Conference of the 
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, U.S.A., April 20-23 2006). 
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separating the impact of hard power resources and soft power resources. Can China’s 
soft power resources improve China’s national image? Does China have a better 
image only because of it hard power? What are the factors that influence China’s 
image in a significant way? The qualitative approach seems unable to answer these 
questions as it is difficult to distinguish the impact of soft power resources from the 
impact of hard power resources on the outcome. By adding the hard power variables 
as control variables, the regression models could tell the unique influence of China’s 
soft power resources on its outcome operationalized as China’s national image.  
 
Although the current studies do not specify the relationship between China’s soft 
power resources and its outcome, they provide detailed descriptions on China’s soft 
power resources that help the conceptualization and operationalization. Based on 
these descriptions, this thesis quantifies China’s soft power resource by building some 
indexes for each resource.  
 
To sum up, the current literature on China’s soft power presents detailed descriptions 
on the resources and constraints of China’s soft power, but does not clearly explore 
how these resources and constraints influence China’s image, and could not 
distinguish the influence of soft power from the influence of hard power. This thesis 
thus applies a quantitative approach to access the relationship between China’s soft 
power resources and its national image. A regression model controlling the impact of 
hard power aims to find out whether China’s soft power resources have a unique 
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impact on China’s national image, and tries to explore the factors that significantly 
influence or shape China’s image. 
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Chapter 3 Modeling China’s Soft Power: 
The Operationalization and Measurement  
of Its Resources and Outcome 
 
The previous chapter reviewed the soft power theory and China’s soft power in terms 
of its resources and constraints. Most of the literature applies a qualitative or 
descriptive approach that presents some evidence of China’s rising soft power, or 
discusses the factors that influence China’s soft power. However, such qualitative 
studies could not assess the relationship between China’s soft power resources and its 
outcome. Neither can they distinguish the impact of soft power resources from the 
impact of hard power resources. A quantitative approach that uses regression analysis 
could examine the relationship between China’s soft power resource and its outcome. 
Furthermore, by controlling hard power resources, it could assess the unique impact 
of China’s soft power resources on its national image. 
 
This chapter first introduces the background of China’s soft power projection. Next, it 
operationalizes China’s soft power and hard power resources by constructing several 
indexes for measurement. It operationalizes the outcome of China’s soft power as 
China’ national image. Thus China’s soft power resources and its outcome are 
operationalized into measurable independent variables and dependent variables, with 
China’s hard power resource operationalized as control variables. The 
conceptualization and operationalization of China’s soft power pave the way for 
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model building in this chapter. 
 
3-1 Background 
The Chinese government stresses the peaceful nature of its foreign policy.75 “Peaceful 
rise”, or “peaceful development”, advocated by the Chinese government in recent 
years, on the one hand reflects the anxiety or fear among the international community 
due to China’s rapid economic growth. One the other hand, this policy (including the 
nuanced change of terminology from “rise” to a less aggressive “development”) 
indicates China’s awareness of such anxiety or fear, which may turn into something 
adverse to its development if not handled properly. To build a positive image among 
the foreign audience is a major aim set by the Chinese government. 
 
A country’s national image could be measured by the popularity of this country 
among foreign citizens. Global public opinion polls, such as the Program on 
International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), and Pew Global Attitudes Project (PEW), 
conduct surveys in a number of countries in the world in various years. Their 
questionnaires include a rating for a specific country in terms of a respondent’s 
attitude towards this country. Although ephemeral and subject to contingence as 
acknowledged by Nye,76 these data are a direct indicator of a country’s popularity 
among foreign audience. As the unit of analysis is not in an individual level, the data 
are calculated by treating one surveyed country as one observation. The outcome of 
                                                        
75 "China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The People's Republic of China, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24881.htm (Accessed 2005-11-1). 
76 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 18. 
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China’s soft power is measured by how positive a surveyed country’s attitude towards 
China is. 
 
A positive image not only comes from a country’s soft power, but also from its hard 
power. Both China’s soft power and hard power may have an impact on China’s 
national image. To examine such an impact, we should assess the resources of China’s 
soft power and hard power. The next section discusses various dimensions of China’s 
soft power and hard power resources, and builds some indexes for measurement, in 
order to operationalize these resources into measurable independent variables. 
 
3-2 China’s Soft Power Resources 
Soft power comes from culture, domestic political value and foreign policy.77 As 
reviewed in Chapter 2, China’s soft power resources could also be categorized into 
these three aspects. 
 
3-2-1 Culture 
The first category of China’s soft power resources is culture. The Chinese empires 
created a great historic civilization and had a great influence on neighboring countries, 
the tribute system being a good manifestation. Traditional Chinese philosophy, 
meditation, literature and art works interest foreigners a lot. While it is difficult to 
measure the impact of Ancient China’s cultural dominance, the tribute system serves 
                                                        
77 Ibid., 11. 
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as a proxy to its historical cultural influence over the world. A country which used to 
be in the tribute system is more influenced by traditional Chinese culture. Whether 
this influence could turn into credit to a positive image of China would be tested in 
the model in the next chapter. The first independent variable “Tradition” is a dummy 
variable. The country scores 1 if it was in the Chinese tribute system in history, or had 
ever paid tribute to the Chinese empires, and scores 0 if it was not. I refer to Li’s 2004 
book, History of Tribute System: A Study of Ancient China’s Foreign Relations,78 to determine 
which countries participated in the Chinese tribute system. As these countries are 
referred to by archaic names, I refer to Chinese Historical Gazetteer79 and Chinese 
Encyclopedia: Chinese History80 to “translate” the archaic country names into modern 
ones. The ancient countries do not perfectly match the modern countries and some 
archaic names could not find the corresponding modern names, but generally the list 
accords with our common knowledge. Countries that were in the Chinese tribute 
system include: Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, 
Kyrgyzstan, Cambodian, Burma, Laos, Brunei, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan，
Russia, Turkey, Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Iran81, Iraq, Oman, 
Maldives, Yemen, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Italy82 and Syria. 
                                                        
78 Yunquan Li, History of Tribute System: A Study of Ancient China's Foreign Relations (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 
2004). (李云泉：《朝贡制度史：中国古代对外关系硏究》，北京：新华出版社，2004。) 
79 Chinese Historical Gazetteer, ed. Songshan Wei (Guangzhou: Guangdong Education Press, 1995). (魏嵩山主
编：《中国历史地名大辞典》， 广州：广东教育出版社，1995。) 
80 Chinese Encyclopedia: Chinese History, (Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Press, 1992). (《中国大百科全书. 中
国历史》， 北京：中国大百科全书出版社, 1992。) 
81 Persia was a tribute-sending state to the Chinese Empire during Tang Dynasty. See Dexing Li, Gongwang Liu 
and Yuxing Wang, Brief Discussion on Several Approaches of Intercommunication in Medicine between China 
and Arabia, Journal of Tianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, no. 3 (2004): 119; (李德杏，刘公
望，王玉兴：“浅析中国与阿拉伯医药交流的实现途径”，《天津中医学院学报》2004 年第 3期。) 
82 The Curia Romana, or the “Sunset State” in China’s historical records, paid tribute to the Chinese Empire 
during the Ming Dynasty. See Dake Liao, A Study of the “Sunset State”, Journal of Xiamen University (Arts &   
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Another variable, “Confucianism”, measures the influence of Confucianism, the once 
dominant traditional Chinese philosophy. East Asian countries share similar cultural 
and historical backgrounds where Confucianism is one of the components. “In East 
Asian countries, Confucian cultural systems have been deconstructed to different 
extent due to the changes of social economic basis and political system. However, as a 
cultural tradition, Confucian culture has not totally disappeared. Some elements have 
been activated, resulting from the impact of foreign culture, and played a role in the 
process of East Asian countries’ modernization.”83  
 
Since Confucianism originated in China, and is believed to play a positive role in East 
Asian countries’ modernization, my hypothesis is that Confucianism is a positive soft 
power resource: a country influenced more by Confucianism should have a more 
favorable opinion of China. “Confucianism” is an ordinal variable: 2 for the countries 
within the “Confucian cultural circle” which had been influenced deeply by 
Confucianism; 1 for the countries within the “Confucian cultural circle” but had been 
influenced by Confucianism less than those scoring 2; 0 for those countries outside 
the “Confucian cultural circle”. The criterion for the coding is based on Confucianism 
and Modern Society edited by He and Li.84 The countries scoring 2 include: Vietnam, 
Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Singapore. The countries scoring 1 include: 
Laos, Cambodia, Burma, and Thailand.  
                                                                                                                                                               
Social Sciences), no. 4 (2005): 108-114. (廖大珂：“‘日落国’考证——兼论明代中国与罗马教廷的交往”,《厦
门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2005 年第 4 期。) 
83 Confucianism and Modern Society, ed. Chengxuan He and Suping Li (Shenyang: Shenyang Press, 2001), 3. (何
成轩, 李苏平主编：《儒学与现代社会》，沈阳：沈阳出版社, 2001 第 1 版。) 
84 Ibid.   
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Besides traditional culture, Chinese popular culture is another resource of soft power. 
To measure the impact of Chinese popular culture, I use Chinese cultural products 
(calculated in million US dollars) exporting to a country, such as books, newspapers, 
music, film, and works of art as indicators. These data are available at the United 
Nation Commodity Trade Statistics Database. These cultural products include: 
 
Printed material--HS49 
Name: Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing 
Description: Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing 
industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans 
 
Books--HS4901 
Name: Printed books, brochures, leaflets and similar printed matter 
Description: Printed books, brochures, leaflets and similar printed matter, whether or 
not in single sheets. 
 
Newspapers--HS4902 
Name: Newspapers, journals and periodicals 
Description: Newspapers, journals and periodicals, whether or not illustrated or 
containing advertising material. 
 
Films--HS3706 
Name: Cinematographic film, exposed and developed 
Description: Cinematographic film, exposed and developed, whether or not 
incorporating sound track or consisting only of sound track. 
 
Music--HS8524 
Name: Sound recordings other than photographic equipment 
Description: Records, tapes and other recorded media for sound or other similarly 
recorded phenomena, including matrices and masters for the production of records, 
but excluding products of Chapter 37. 
 
Art works--HS97 
Name: Works of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques 
Description: Works of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques 
 
For each surveyed country, I calculate the total value of these six cultural products 
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that China exported in the surveyed year in million US dollars. This variable “Cultural 
products” measures the impact of China’s popular culture on the surveyed countries. 
A country should have more positive attitudes towards China if China exported more 
cultural products to it. 
 
The Chinese language has become increasingly popular in foreign countries. In order 
to meet the increasing demand for learning the Chinese language, the Chinese 
government set up Confucius Institutes, to “promote friendly relationship with other 
countries”, “enhance the understanding of the Chinese language and culture” and 
“provide good learning conditions for the Chinese learners among the world”.85 By 
the end of 2006, more than 120 Confucius Institutes had been established in 50 
countries and regions.86 To measure the popularity of Chinese language in a country, I 
count the number of Confucius Institutes in each country in the surveyed year, with 
the information from the Office of Chinese Language Council International. 87  
Although the Confucius Institute is not the only channel for foreigners to learn 
Chinese, these numbers reflect the degree of demand from Chinese language learners 
in a country. It is reasonable to conclude that the more Confucius Institutes a country 
has, the greater the number of Chinese learners in this country, thus the greater impact 
of Chinese language will have on this country. Such impact is expected to be positive: 
the more Confucius Institutes a country has, the more people in that country will have 
                                                        
85 "Introduction to The "Confucius Institute" Project," The Office of Chinese Language Council International, 
http://english.hanban.edu.cn/market/HanBanE/412360.htm (Accessed 2007-9-6). 
86 "Global Distribution of Confucius Institutes," Confucius Institute Division, The Office of Chinese Language 
Council International, http://www.hanban.org/en_hanban/content.php?id=2519. (Accessed 2007-01-20). 
87 "Confucius Institutes in the World," Confucius Institute Division, The Office of Chinese Language Council 
International, http://www.hanban.org/en_hanban/kzxy_list.php?ithd=gzky. (Accessed 2007-1-1). 
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positive attitudes towards China. 
 
Education could be a resource of soft power in that students studying abroad not only 
receive knowledge of their field, but also learn about the culture, values, the way of 
thinking, norms, etc. of the country they stay in. Such influence may establish an 
impression of the host country or shape the image of the host country. The increasing 
number of foreign students coming to China seems to demonstrate China’s increasing 
attractiveness. To measure the education factor, the variable “Education” counts the 
number of foreign students studying in China in the surveyed year for each country, 
with the statistics provided by Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.88 The larger the 
number of students from a country studying in China, the greater the impact of 
Chinese education will have on this country, and more positive opinions of China are 
expected in this country. 
 
Tourism is another resource of soft power. Tourists choose a destination of cultural 
attractiveness. The growing number of foreign tourists coming to China shows the 
increasing attractiveness of Chinese culture. To measure the impact of tourism as an 
indicator of soft power resource, the variable “Tourism” counts the number of tourists 
to China for each country in the surveyed year, using the data from the Chinese 
National Bureau of Statistics.89 Larger numbers of tourists from a country to China 
                                                        
88 China's Foreign Affairs, ed. People's Republic of China Department of Policy Planning Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). 
89 Yearbook of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, ed. the editorial board of the Yearbook of China's 
foreign economic relations and trade (Beijing: China Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Publishing House, 
2002,2003). China Trade and External Economic Statistical Yearbook, ed. National Bureau of Statistics 
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indicate a greater impact of Chinese tourism on this country. Like the impact of 
education, I expect the impact of tourism to be positive: more inbound tourists will 
generate more positive attitudes towards China in the surveyed country. 
 
3-2-2 Political Value 
The second category of soft power resource is China’s domestic political value. 
Domestic values and policy not only relate to the welfare of Chinese people and the 
legitimacy of the Chinese government, but also have an impact on China’s image or 
reputation abroad. Good governance, universal values and a legitimate regime create a 
positive impression on foreign audience, while corruption, narrow and parochial 
values, and brutal policies undermine China’s attractiveness abroad. 
 
The impact of China’s domestic political value is difficult to measure. Content 
analysis of the reports on China’s domestic policy by looking at a country’s 
mainstream media could be one approach, which may be conducted in future research. 
In this thesis, the variable “Democracy” that examines a country’s degree of 
democracy by Democracy Score in Polity IV project90 is used to measure the impact 
of China’s domestic political value. It is a dummy variable to indicate whether a 
country is democratic or not. A democratic country, defined as one with Democracy 
Score 5 or above, is coded 1, and a non-democratic country, defined as one with 
                                                                                                                                                               
Department of Trade and External Economic Relation Statistics, People's Republic of China. (Beijing: China 
Statistics Press, 2006). 
90 Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, "Polity IV Country Reports 2003," Center for International Development 
and Conflict Management, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/country_reports/report.htm (Accessed 2006-7-1). 
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Democracy Score below 5, is coded 0. As China is not a democracy in this setting, a 
country scoring 1 means it has a different political ideology from China. This variable 
aims to test whether a country’s political values or ideology, i.e. being a democracy or 
not, or having the same political ideology as China or not, will have an impact on this 
country’s attitude towards China. Scholars studying China’s soft power agree that 
China’s political system constrains its soft power development as democracy is 
considered as a universal value.91 Therefore, I hypothesize that a democratic country 
would have a more negative attitude towards China than a non-democratic country. 
 
3-2-3 Foreign Policy 
The third category of China’s soft power resource is foreign policy. A country’s 
foreign policy which is “seen as legitimate and having moral authority”92 could be 
one resource of that country’s soft power. Chinese foreign policy has shifted from 
being ideological and confrontational to pragmatic and peaceful. It has shown greater 
flexibility on territorial disputes with neighboring countries, increased membership in 
international institutions and organizations, made increasing efforts to conform more 
to international norms on sensitive issues, become more active in international agenda 
setting, and has been aggressive in pursuing public diplomacy93.  
 
I use two variables, i.e. “IO participation” and “Foreign aid” to assess China’s “new 
                                                        
91 Gill and Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'"; Zhang, "Tapping Soft Power: Managing China's 
'Peaceful Rise' and the Implications for the World." 
92 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 5. 
93 Huang and Ding, "Dragon's Underbelly: An Analysis of China's Soft Power."  
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diplomacy”. Participation in international organizations (“IO participation”) counts 
the number of international organizations that both China and a country take part in. It 
reflects the degree of common interest in international affairs, agenda setting, and 
multilateral foreign policy. Therefore, it is expected that the greater the number is, the 
more positive a country’s attitude will be towards China.  The World Factbook from 
the US Central Intelligent Agency (CIA) provides information of what international 
organizations that each country takes part in for each year.94 This information is used 
for coding the variable “IO participation”.  
 
As there are no official statistics on the amount of China’s aid to a country, I cannot 
use the specific figure to code the variable “Foreign aid”. Instead I use a dummy 
variable that codes 1 if a country received aid from China in the surveyed year, and 0 
if otherwise. I rely on the reports on “China’s Aid to Foreign Countries” and the lists 
of China’s aid programmes from China Commerce Yearbook95 for the coding. In 
other words, a country is coded 1 for variable “Foreign aid” if it is mentioned in the 
report or the list as the recipient of China’s aid programmes. Naturally, I also apply 
the definition of China’s foreign aid in these reports and lists, including: aiding plant 
projects and unit equipment, aiding technical cooperative projects, financing 
concessional loan projects, sending young volunteers overseas, delivering emergency 
assistance to relieve several international humanitarian disasters. 
 
                                                        
94 "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.A., 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (Accessed 2006-7-1). Under “Government, 
International organization participation”. 
95 China Commerce Yearbook, ed. The Editorial Board of the China Commerce Yearbook (Beijing: China 
Commerce and Trade Press, 2004, 2005, 2006).  
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3-3 China’s Hard Power Resources  
A country’s hard power refers to its military and economic strength. As power is not 
decided by the power holder, but by both the power holder and power receiver, it is 
more appropriate to consider power in relative rather than absolute terms. China’s 
military expenditure and economic growth mean different things to strong and weak 
countries, thus China’s hard power should have different impacts and implications for 
different countries. To measure China’s hard power resources, I use the relative value, 
i.e. the difference between China and a surveyed country in terms of the strength of 
hard power resources. 
 
3-3-1 Military Power 
Four indicators are used to measure China’s military power, namely “Military 
expenditure (relative)”, “% military in GDP”, “Highest MID” and “Dispute times”.  
 
“Military expenditure (relative)” equals to the surveyed country’s annual military 
spending in relative term comparing to China. (i.e. China’s military expenditure minus 
that country’s military expenditure) A greater value indicates that China has stronger 
military power over that country in terms of military spending. “% military in GDP” 
calculates the country’s military expenditure as the percentage of its GDP. The figures 
in these two variables come from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) military expenditure database. “Highest MID” (Militarized Interstate Disputes) 
measures the highest hostility level in disputes. It ranges from 1 to 5:  “1-No 
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militarized action; 2-Threat to use force; 3-Display of force; 4-Use of force; 5-War”.  
“Dispute times” counts the numbers of disputes between China and a country during 
1816 and 2001. “Highest MID” measures the intensity of the disputes, while “Dispute 
times” measures the frequency of the disputes. Militarized Dispute Data from 
Correlates of War (COW)96 are used to code these two variables.  
 
“Military expenditure (relative)” and “% military in GDP” reflect the current military 
power relation between China and a surveyed country, while “Highest MID” and 
“Dispute times” assess the historical impact of China’s military power on that country.  
 
3-3-2 Economic Power 
China’s economic power can be measured by its relative economic performance and 
trade relations with the surveyed country. “GDP (relative)” equals China’s GDP minus 
the surveyed country’s GDP97. A greater value indicates that China has stronger 
economic power over that country in terms of GDP. “China’s import from the 
country” and “China’s export to the country” calculate the amount of bilateral trade 
between the country and China in million US dollars. “% of trade with China in total 
trade” calculates the percentage of trade with China as the country’s total foreign 
trade.98 “China’s import>China’s export” is a dummy variable scoring 1 if China’s 
import is greater than its export to the country, and 0 if China’s export is greater than 
                                                        
96 "Militarized Interstate Disputes (V3.02)," Correlates of War, 
http://cow2.la.psu.edu/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID302.html. (Accessed 2007-1-26) 
97 GDP measured as PPP yields similar result. 
98 Calculated in terms of FOB and CIF.  
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its import from that country. For the variable of each economic resources discussed 
above, the calculation of the value is based on the source data from International 
Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund (IMF).99  
 
Besides the trade partnership, the export competition between China and the surveyed 
country could have some impact on China’s image, as the surveyed country may 
complain about its waning export advantage due to China’s fast growing and 
aggressive exportation. Variable “Export competition” calculate the “coefficient of 
specialization” (CS) which compares the exporting structure of China with a surveyed 
country, assuming that the trade competition is more likely if the exporting structure 
between these two countries is quite similar. The greater the value of CS for a 
surveyed country, the greater export competition between China and this country.100  
The formula to calculate CS is: 
∑ −−=
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Where  and  equals the share of good “n” (classified in SITC code) in total 
exports of country “i” (the surveyed country) and country “j” (China) in the period “t” 
(the year of 2004, 2005, 2006). I calculate the value of CS using the data from United 
Nation Commodity Trade Statistics Database.
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101  
 
                                                        
99 International Financial Statistics Yearbook, ed. International Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C.: 2004-2007). 
100 Blázquez-Lidoy Jorge, Rodríguez Javier and Santiso Javier, "Angel or Devil? Chinese Trade Impact on Latin 
American Emerging Markets," OECD Development Centre, Working Paper, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/3/37054336.pdf (Accessed 2007-4-1). 17. 
101 "United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database," United Nations Statistics Division, 
http://comtrade.un.org/db/dqQuickQuery.aspx. (Accessed 2007-1-1) 
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3-4 China’s National Image as the Outcome of Its Soft Power 
As discussed above, the outcome of China’s soft power would be operationalized as 
China’s national image, measured by its popularity rating in global surveys. After 
constructing the indexes for the measurement of independent variables, i.e. soft power 
resources variables, and the measurement of control variables, i.e. hard power 
resources variables, this section selects the data for the measurement of the dependent 
variables from various global surveys and public opinion polls. 
 
Currently five global surveys provide data of the public opinion poll that involved in 
the impression of China. Table 3-1 summarizes the features of each survey. 
 
Among these surveys, Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and Pew 
Global Attitudes Project (PEW) are chosen to operationalize the dependent variable.  
PIPA surveys covered more than 26 countries and provide 79 observations, some of 
which are surveyed more than once. PEW surveys covered more than 46 countries, 
and provide 82 observations102. Both meet the requirement of statistical analysis in 
terms of sufficient observations103. Further more, they covered more countries than the 
other surveys. The Transatlantic Trends and AsiaBarometer (AB) mainly survey the 
European countries and Asian countries respectively, thus they are focusing on 
regional rather than global attitudes towards China. Asian Barometer (ABS) and East 
Asia Barometer did not provide sufficient observations for a statistical analysis.  
                                                        
102 76 observations in 2005-2007. 
103 The common requirement for a regression analysis is that there should be at least 30 observations. 
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Table 3-1 Global Public Opinion Surveys of the Impression of China 
Survey Measurement Questions asked Surveyed 
time 
Number 
of 
Surveyed 
Countries 
(not 
including 
China) 
Surveyed countries 
Transatlantic 
Trends104  
Scores indicating 
the warmth 
(average in that 
country) towards 
China  
Q12 Next I’d like you to rate 
your feelings towards some 
countries, institutions and 
people, with 100 meaning a 
very warm, favourable 
feeling, 0 meaning a very 
cold, unfavourable feeling, 
and 50 meaning not 
particularly warm or cold. You 
can use any number from 0 to 
100. If you have no opinion or 
have never heard of that 
country or institution, please 
say so.[0-100] 
2003 
(Jun.2003) 
8 
countries 
E7 (United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Italy, 
Poland and 
Portugal)+US 
2004 
(Jun.2004) 
11 
countries 
E10 (United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Italy, 
Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain, 
Turkey)+US 
2005 
(May-Jun. 
2005) 
11 
countries 
E10 (United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Italy, 
Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain, 
Turkey)+US 
2006   
(Jun. 2006) 
13 
countries 
E12 (United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Italy, 
Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Romania)+US 
2007 
(Jun.2007) 
13 
countries  
E12 (United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Italy, 
Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Romania)+US 
 
 
 
                                                        
104 "2007 Topline Data, Trandslatlantic Trends," The German Marshall Fund of the United States and Compagnia 
di San Paolo, http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/index.cfm?id=56. (Accessed 2007-9-14). 
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Table 3-1 Global Public Opinion Surveys of the Impression of China (continued) 
Survey Measurement Questions asked Surveyed 
time 
Number of 
Surveyed 
Countries 
(not 
including 
China) 
Surveyed countries 
Program on 
International 
Policy 
Attitudes 
(PIPA)105
% of mainly 
positive/ 
negative 
Please tell me if you 
think each of the 
following are having a 
mainly positive or 
mainly negative 
influence in the 
world . . . China  
[Mainly positive/ 
Mainly negative/ 
Depends/ 
Neither, no difference/ 
DK/NA] 
2004 
(Nov.2004- 
Jan. 2005) 
21 countries Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Lebanon, Mexico, Russia, 
Philippines, Poland, South 
Africa, South Korea, Turkey, 
United States  
2005 
(Oct.-Dec. 
2005) 
32 countries Afghanistan, Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Democratic republic of Congo, 
Finland, France, Germany, 
Ghana, Great Britain, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, 
Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South 
Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Tanzania, Turkey, 
United States, Zimbabwe 
2006 
(Nov.2006- 
Jan.207) 
26 countries Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, 
Greece, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, 
Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Russia, South Korea, Turkey, 
UAE, United States 
 
                                                        
105 "22 Nation Poll on China, BBC World Service Poll," Program on International Policy Attitudes 
http://www.pipa.org/archives/global_opinion.php (Accessed 2006-7-14); "33 Nation Poll on Views of 
Countries, a BBC World Service Poll," Program on International Policy Attitudes, 
http://www.pipa.org/archives/global_opinion.php. (Accessed 2006-7-14); "Israel and Iran Share Most Negative 
Ratings in Global Poll," Program on International Policy Attitudes,  
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/325.php?nid=&id=&pnt=325&lb=hmpg1. 
(Accessed 2007-4-22). 
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Table 3-1 Global Public Opinion Surveys of the Impression of China (continued) 
Survey Measurement Questions 
asked 
Surveyed 
time 
Number of 
Surveyed 
Countries 
(not including 
China) 
Surveyed countries 
Pew Global 
Attitudes 
Project 
(PEW)106
% of very 
favorable/ 
somewhat 
favorable/ 
somewhat 
unfavorable/ 
very unfavorable 
Please tell me if 
you have a very 
favorable, 
somewhat 
favorable, 
somewhat 
unfavorable, or 
very unfavorable 
opinion of China 
2002 6 countries Russia, Indonesia, Japan, 
Philippines, South Korea, 
Vietnam 
2005 
(Apr.-Jun. 
2005) 
16 countries United States, Canada, 
Great Britain, France, 
Germany, Spain, 
Netherlands, Russia, 
Poland, Turkey, Pakistan, 
India, Lebanon, Jordan, 
Morocco, Indonesia 
2006 
(Mar.-May 
2006) 
14 countries United States, Great Britain, 
France, Germany, Spain, 
Russia, Egypt, Turkey, 
Indonesia, India, Pakistan, 
Jordan, Nigeria, Japan 
2007 
(Apr.-May) 
46 countries Argentina, Bangladesh, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Britain, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, France, Germany, 
Ghana, India, Indonesia, 
Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, 
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, 
Mali, Mexico, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Palestinian ter., Peru, 
Poland, Russia, Senegal, 
Slovakia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Spain, 
Sweden, Tanzania, Turkey, 
Uganda, Ukraine, United 
States, Venezuela 
 
                                                        
106 "Global Unease with Major World Powers," Pew Global Attitudes Project, 
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256 (Accessed 2007-6-28). 
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Table 3-1 Global Public Opinion Surveys of the Impression of China (continued) 
Survey Measurement Questions asked Surveyed 
time 
Number of 
Surveyed 
Countries 
(not 
including 
China) 
Surveyed 
countries 
AsiaBarometer 
(AB)107
% of Good 
influence/ 
Rather good 
influence/ 
Neither good 
nor bad 
influence/ 
Rather bad 
influence/ Bad 
influence 
Do you think the 
following countries 
have a good influence 
or a bad influence on 
your country? (China) 
[Good influence/ 
Rather good influence/ 
Neither good nor bad 
influence/ Rather bad 
influence/ Bad 
influence/Don’t know] 
2003 8 countries Japan, South 
Korea, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Vietnam, 
India, Sri Lanka, 
Uzbekistan 
2004 10 countries Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Japan, 
Philippines, 
Thailand, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, 
Singapore, Korea, 
Laos 
2006108  4 countries Japan, Korea, 
Singapore, 
Vietnam 
East Asia 
Barometer [part 
of the Asian 
Barometer 
(ABS)]109  
Scores 
indicating the 
warmth 
(average in that 
country) 
towards China 
Using a similar scale, 
please let us know 
about your impressions 
of the following 
countries. Give it a 
grade from 1 to 10, 
being 1 very bad and 
10 very good. (China) 
2006110  5 countries Mongolia, 
Philippines, 
Thailand, 
Indonesia, 
Singapore 
 
 
 
                                                        
107 Takashi Inoguchi, et al., "Asiabarometer Survey Data 2003," AsiaBarometer Project, 
https://www.asiabarometer.org/en/data (Accessed 2007-6-6); Takashi Inoguchi, et al., "Asiabarometer Survey 
Data 2004," AsiaBarometer Project, https://www.asiabarometer.org/en/data (Accessed 2007-6-6). 
108 I am indebted to Dr. Wang Zhengxu who is a team member of East Asia Barometer in Singapore and provided 
the data. 
109 "The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS)," The Asian Barometer 
http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/surveys/SurveyTopics_wave2.htm (Accessed 2007-8-30 ). 
110 I am indebted to Dr. Wang Zhengxu who is a team member of East Asia Barometer in Singapore and provided 
the data.  
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Given greater data availability, future studies may compare China’s popularity in 
European countries and Asian countries. 
 
The question in the PIPA survey that we are interested in is: “Please tell me if you 
think each of the following are having a mainly positive or mainly negative influence 
in the world . . . China.” Response fell in five categories: mainly positive, mainly 
negative, depends, neither/no difference, don’t know/NA. I use the percentage of 
respondents answering “mainly positive” as my first dependent variable “positive”, 
and the percentage of respondents answering “mainly negative” as the second 
dependent variable “negative”. I also calculate the percentage of “net positive” which 
equals to the value of “positive” minus the value of “negative”. 
 
For the PEW survey, the question is “Please tell me if you have a very favorable, 
somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of China”. 
Similarly, I calculate the percentage of respondents answering “very favorable” and 
“somewhat favorable” as the value for the first dependent variable “positive”, and the 
percentage of respondents answering “very unfavorable” and “somewhat 
unfavorable” as the value for the second dependent variable “negative”. The third 
variable “net positive” equals to the value of “positive” minus the value of “negative”. 
 
For these two datasets, a higher value for the first dependent variable “positive” and 
the third dependent variable “net positive” indicates a good national image of China in 
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the surveyed country, while a higher value for the second dependent variable 
“negative” indicates a bad image. 
 
As Nye admitted, survey results are ephemeral and easily subject to contingency.111 
To address this problem, I pool all the surveys and construct an index for the 
percentage of positive survey results from the repeated measurements as a remedy. 
Some countries were surveyed more than once112. By examining all survey results for 
various years by different surveys, for each country I count the number of the positive 
results, defined as a survey in which the positive attitudes outnumbered the negative 
attitudes towards China. Then I calculate the percentage of these positive results in all 
the survey results a country had. For example, Canada has been surveyed 5 times, and 
in 4 surveys there were more positive views than negative views towards China. Thus, 
Canada scores 0.8 (4 divided by 5) in the index for percentage of positive survey 
results. The countries being surveyed only once would score either 1 or 0. Thus this 
index varies from 0 to 1 and could be regarded as a continuous dependent variable 
which is required for OLS regression. 
 
To sum up, three datasets are used to analysis the relationship between China’s soft 
power and hard power resources and its national image: PIPA, PEW and the pooled 
dataset. Using the first two datasets could address the causality issue better because 
the independent variables precede the dependent variables. PIPA surveys were 
                                                        
111 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 18. 
112 In total there are 68 countries being surveyed, and 41 countries were survey more than once. 
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conducted at the end of 2004, 2005 and 2006. Therefore, I use the data in 2004, 2005 
and 2006 for the independent variables. PEW surveys were conducted in the middle 
of 2005, 2006 and 2007. By the same token, I use the data in 2004, 2005 and 2006 
instead of 2005, 2006 and 2007 for the independent variables. The pooled dataset has 
more observations than the other two datasets, and therefore allows more variances 
for the independent variables. Furthermore, it has more stable dependent variables for 
its repeated measurement. However, the time order may be a concern because all the 
dependent variables and the independent variables are measured in average term 
during 2001 to 2006. Thus it could not guarantee a precondition for causality. That is 
to say, the result for PIPA and PEW datasets could be interpreted as a causal relation, 
while for the pooled dataset the result should be regarded as a correlation rather than 
causality. 
 
3-5 Data Transformation 
Before running the OLS regression, I observe the distribution of the data to see 
whether they need to be transformed. First I create a scatter matrix for the dependent 
variables and each independent variable in three datasets to check the linearity of the 
distribution. Some independent variables do not present a linear pattern and are highly 
skewed to the left. After taking the natural logarithm of these variables, the scatter 
plots show a linear pattern. “Cultural products”, “Education”, “Tourism”, “China’s 
import from the country”, “China’s export to the country” are transformed to the value 
of its natural logarithm. “Military expenditure (relative)” and “GDP (relative)” are 
 50
transformed to the difference of China’s figure in natural logarithm and the surveyed 
country’s figure in natural logarithm, i.e. ln(China’s value)-ln(the country’s value).  
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Chapter 4   Findings from the Regression Models: 
Results and Discussion 
 
The previous chapter operationalizes China’s power resources and the outcome into 
measurable independent variables and dependent variables, and transforms the data so 
that the assumptions for using OLS regression are not violated. This chapter builds 
several models to examine the relationship between China’s soft power and hard 
power resources and China’s national image. First I construct a “soft power model” 
that uses independent variables of soft power resources to predict the dependent 
variables. Next I construct a “hard power model” that uses independent variables of 
hard power resources to predict the dependent variables. After running these two sets 
of models, I include both soft power and hard power independent variables as a full 
model. Thus I compare these three sets of models in terms of model fits and the 
changes in each coefficient.  
 
4-1 Soft Power Model 
The soft power model aims to assess the relationship between China’s soft power 
resources and its national image. From the regression results113, seven variables out of 
nine indicate a significant impact (i.e. significant coefficient) at least in one dataset, 
and four coefficients are both significant and in the same direction with the 
hypothesis.  
                                                       
Table 4-1 Soft Power Model 
 
113 See Table 4-1 Soft Power Model.  
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 Positive  Negative  Net positive 
 PEW PIPA PEW PIPA PEW PIPA pooled 
(Constant) 37.17  61.30+  55.95  24.52  -18.79  36.78  -0.16  
 (28.10)  (27.82)  (33.55)  (19.05)  (58.45)  (41.78)  (0.61)  
Tradition -1.37  3.99  -1.57  -10.21** 0.20  14.20*  0.06  
 (5.10)  (27.82)  (6.09)  (3.06)  (10.61)  (6.71)  (0.12)  
Confucianism -13.69**  -3.19  18.02**  -2.36  -31.72**  -0.83  0.08  
 (4.29)  (27.82)  (5.12)  (3.58)  (8.91)  (7.84)  (0.12)  
Cultural products -1.90  -0.84  0.03  -1.76  -1.93  0.93  0.08  
 (1.92)  (27.82)  (2.29)  (1.09)  (3.99)  (2.38)  (0.05)  
Confucius Institute -1.11  -0.85  0.69  4.82+  -1.80  -5.67  -0.05*  
 (0.80)  (27.82)  (0.96)  (2.51)  (1.67)  (5.51)  (0.02)  
Education 2.45  -1.45  -1.57  2.54  4.02  -3.99  0.02  
 (2.57)  (27.82)  (3.06)  (1.93)  (5.34)  (4.24)  (0.07)  
Tourism 5.80+  1.55  -3.93  5.14*  9.73  -3.59  -0.05  
 (3.40)  (27.82)  (4.06)  (2.15)  (7.07)  (4.72)  (0.06)  
Democracy -24.90*** -9.74  21.76**  4.40  -46.66*** -14.14  0.01  
 (5.87)  (27.82)  (7.01)  (5.18)  (12.21)  (11.35)  (0.13)  
IO participation -0.38  -0.11  0.33  -0.97+  -0.71  0.86  6.72E-04 
 (0.68)  (27.82)  (0.82)  (0.54)  (1.42)  (1.18)  (0.01)  
Foreign aid -1.83  1.76  4.16  -9.87**  -5.99  11.63  0.35**  
 (4.77)  (27.82)  (5.69)  (3.59)  (9.92)  (7.87)  (0.11)  
N 43  53  43  53  43  53  55  
F 4.53***  1.28  3.05**  8.33***  3.95**  3.86**  2.27*  
Adjusted R Square 0.43  0.05  0.31  0.56  0.39  0.33  0.18  
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression (standard errors in parentheses). 
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; +p< 0.1 (two-tailed test). 
 
“Tradition”, “Democracy” and “Foreign aid” show strong impacts on China’s image 
in that they yield significant coefficients in more than one dataset with an identical 
sign to the hypothesis. A country that had paid tribute to ancient Chinese empires 
seems to agree that China has a mainly positive influence in the world. People in 
democratic countries tend to have unfavorable opinions of non-democratic China. 
China’s foreign aid programmes help to alleviate its negative image of having a 
mainly negative influence in the world and increase the chance of an overall positive 
image in a surveyed country.  
 53
 “IO participation” has a weak impact on China’s image, as we observe only one 
significant coefficient in the PIPA dataset. Like “Foreign aid”, it alleviates China’s 
negative image of having a negative influence in the world.  
 
“Confucianism” and “Confucius Institute” have strong impacts on China’s image. 
However, their impacts are opposite to the hypothesis: they impair rather than 
improve China’s national image. People tend to have unfavorable opinions of China if 
their country had been influenced by the traditional Chinese Confucian philosophy in 
history. The higher the demand for Chinese language study reflected in a larger 
number of Confucius Institutes, the worse China’s perceived influence in the world by 
that surveyed country. 
 
Tourism has a mixed impact on China’s image. On the one hand, it generates a more 
favorable opinion of China. On the other hand, the countries from which more tourists 
visited China consider China’s influence in the world as mainly negative.  
 
Chinese cultural exports and education seem to have little impact on China’s image in 
the results, as there is no significant coefficient even in one dataset.  
 
 
4-2 Hard Power Model 
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The hard power model examines the relation between China’s hard power resources 
and its national image. Among all the ten variables, nine variables have at least one 
significant coefficient in three datasets114. 
Table 4-2 Hard Power Model      
 Positive  Negative  Net positive 
 PEW PIPA PEW PIPA PEW PIPA pooled 
(Constant) 73.50+  154.20*** -22.39  -14.02  95.89  168.22**  0.61  
  (37.27)  (38.68)  (34.68)  (27.09)  (67.36)  (55.21)  (0.62)  
Highest MID 0.54  1.87+  0.11  1.25+  0.43  0.61  -0.02  
  (1.14)  (1.04)  (1.06)  (0.73)  (2.07)  (1.48)  (0.02)  
Dispute times -0.12  -0.35*  0.18  -0.18  -0.30  -0.16  -3.60E-03 
  (0.18)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.11)  (0.33)  (0.23)  (4.78E-03) 
Military expenditure (relative) -11.65  7.34  19.00*  -10.29*  -30.65+  17.63+  -0.12  
(8.51)  (6.64)  (7.92)  (4.65)  (15.39)  (9.48)  (0.16)  
% military in GDP -4.43  3.52  6.99*  -4.44*  -11.41+  7.96+  -0.09  
  (3.53)  (3.01)  (3.28)  (2.11)  (6.38)  (4.30)  (0.05)  
GDP (relative) 12.08  -16.54*  -16.52+  11.09+  28.59  -27.63*  0.18  
  (9.65)  (8.14)  (8.98)  (5.70)  (17.44)  (11.62)  (0.17)  
China’s import from the country -1.60  -4.55+  1.60  2.09  -3.20  -6.64*  0.01  
(2.19)  (2.29)  (2.04)  (1.60)  (3.97)  (3.27)  (0.04)  
China’s export to the country 2.20  -7.00+  -0.05  3.46  2.26  -10.46+  0.08  
(3.89)  (4.01)  (3.62)  (2.81)  (7.03)  (5.73)  (0.07)  
% of trade with China in total trade 23.88  151.16*  -2.89  -73.21+ 26.77  224.37**  1.24  
(59.36)  (57.60)  (55.23)  (40.34)  (107.27)  (82.23)  (1.48)  
China’s import > China’s export 4.86  5.06  -3.76  1.63  8.62  3.43  0.16  
(6.39)  (5.75)  (5.94)  (4.03)  (11.54)  (8.20)  (0.13)  
Export competition -35.37** -32.60**  37.30*** 15.29*  -72.67***  -47.90**  -0.99***  
  (11.39)  (10.36)  (10.60)  (7.26)  (20.58)  (14.79)  (0.22)  
N 74  73  74  73  74  73  59  
F 2.63**  4.52***  3.21**  14.35*** 3.22**  10.11***  6.25***  
Adjusted R Square 0.18  0.33  0.23  0.65  0.23  0.56  0.48  
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression (standard errors in parentheses).    
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; +p< 0.1 (two-tailed test). 
  
 
For military power resources, “Dispute times” has a weak negative impact on China’s 
                                                        
114 See Table 4-2 Hard Power Model. 
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image: the more disputes a country had with China in history, the less people in that 
country consider China’s influence as positive in the world. The other three variables, 
i.e. “Highest MID”, “Military expenditure (relative)” and “% military expenditure in 
GDP” have mixed effects on China’s image: they could improve and impair China’s 
image, as the sign of the significant coefficients do not show a pattern that 
consistently supports or rejects the hypothesis.  A higher level of militarized dispute 
with China invites a greater impression of China’s negative influence as well as 
China’s positive influence in the world. In a country with weak military power, in 
terms of military spending compared to China, more people have unfavorable 
opinions of China, and less people have favorable opinion of China. One the other 
hand, more people consider China’s influence in the world as positive and fewer 
people consider China’s influence as negative. A country whose military expenditure 
takes up a larger proportion of its GDP has more unfavorable opinion and less 
favorable opinion of China. Meanwhile, in such a country more people think that 
China has a mainly positive influence in the world, and fewer people consider China’s 
influence in the world as negative. 
 
For economic resources variables, four out of six show a consistent pattern among 
three datasets. China’s trade with a country, both import and export, has a negative 
impact on China’s image, as the greater import or export value, the worse China’s 
image became, as less people in that country consider China’s influence in the world 
to be positive. However, if we calculate the trade relation in terms of the percentage of 
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bilateral trade with China in the country’s total foreign trade, this trade impact 
becomes positive. A country tends to think of China’s influence in the world as mainly 
positive if China is its important trade partner, i.e. its trade with China takes up a high 
percentage of its total foreign trade. “Export competition” has the strongest impact on 
China’s image as all of its coefficients reach high significance level in three datasets. 
The consistent direction of the sign supports the hypothesis that countries with similar 
export structure with China, hence a high export competition with China, would 
consider China’s influence as mainly negative, and tend to have an unfavorable 
opinion of China. “GDP (relative)”, like “Military expenditure (relative)”, has a mixed 
effect on China’s image. Rich countries consider China’s influence as positive, while 
more people in these rich countries have unfavorable opinion of China.  A country’s 
surplus or deficit in its bilateral trade with China, or trade balance, measured by 
“China’s import>China’s export”, has little impact on China’s image, as none of the 
coefficients is significant in three datasets.  
 
4-3 The Full Model 
The previous sections create two models: a soft power model and a hard power model 
that include only soft power resources and hard power resources in each model. Thus 
in the soft power model, the impact of hard power resources are ignored. As soft 
power resources and hard power resources exist together, they are expected to have 
impacts on China’s national image simultaneously. The third model (i.e. the third 
model) includes both soft power and hard power variables as independent variables. 
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This section first re-assesses each independent variable in the full model to see their 
unique contribution in predicting the dependent variables. Next, it compares three 
models in terms of the change in model fit, as well as the changes in value and sign 
for each coefficient.  
 
Similar to the first two models, I use Pew, PIPA and the pooled datasets to run the 
regressions.  Before comparing the three models, we should look at the regression 
results of the full models including both soft power and hard power variables.115 
 
4-3-1 Soft Power Variables in the Full Model 
For soft power resources, five out of nine variables yield significant coefficients at 
least in one model, and among them four variables support the hypothesis with 
expected signs. 
 
The variable “Tradition” shows a relatively weak impact on China’s image as it has 
only one significant coefficient in three datasets. A country that had ever paid tribute 
to the ancient Chinese empires is less likely to consider China’s influence in the world 
as negative. China’s cultural exports have a positive influence on China’s image. The 
more cultural products that China exported to a country, the fewer respondents in that 
country would consider China’s global influence to be negative. 
                                                        
115 See Table 4-3 Full Model Including Soft Power and Hard Power Variables.  
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Table 4-3 Full Model Including Soft Power and Hard Power Variables 
 Positive  Negative  Net positive  
 PEW PIPA PEW PIPA PEW PIPA pooled 
(Constant) 71.59  168.04** 49.93  -28.41  21.66  196.45*  -0.41  
 (75.17)  (59.60)  (90.06)  (42.84) (153.46)  (85.00)  (1.36)  
Tradition 0.10  -1.07  -6.38  -7.29*  6.48  6.23  0.08  
 (9.36)  (4.65)  (11.21)  (3.35)  (19.10)  (6.64)  (0.11)  
Confucianism -12.69+ -13.94*  19.90*  4.13  -32.59*  -18.07+  -0.01  
 (6.93)  (6.48)  (8.30)  (4.66)  (14.15)  (9.25)  (0.13)  
Cultural products -0.12  2.37  -1.15  -3.20*  1.03  5.57+  0.04  
 (2.68)  (2.07)  (3.22)  (1.49)  (5.48)  (2.95)  (0.06)  
Confucius Institute -0.70  -0.72  0.45  3.40  -1.15  -4.12  0.01  
 (0.76)  (3.23)  (0.92)  (2.32)  (1.56)  (4.61)  (0.02)  
Education -3.75  -0.28  5.67  0.28  -9.41  -0.55  0.00  
 (4.20)  (2.61)  (5.03)  (1.88)  (8.57)  (3.72)  (0.07)  
Tourism 14.94**  9.67**  -14.74*  -0.19  29.68**  9.87*  0.06  
 (5.17)  (3.30)  (6.19)  (2.37)  (10.55)  (4.71)  (0.08)  
Democracy -28.34*  -9.12  26.94*  -3.44  -55.28*  -5.68  0.03  
 (10.69)  (8.47)  (12.81)  (6.09)  (21.83)  (12.08)  (0.14)  
IO participation 0.18  0.20  -1.17  0.12  1.34  0.08  0.01  
 (0.92)  (0.94)  (1.11)  (0.68)  (1.88)  (1.34)  (0.02)  
Foreign aid -0.72  -6.38  3.15  0.34  -3.88  -6.72  0.06  
 (5.15)  (5.64)  (6.17)  (4.05)  (10.51)  (8.04)  (0.14)  
Highest MID -0.26  -0.83  2.51  2.51+  -2.77  -3.34  -0.03  
  (2.65)  (1.77)  (3.17)  (1.27)  (5.41)  (2.52)  (0.02)  
Dispute times -0.85*  -0.74** 0.83+  -0.06  -1.67*  -0.68*  -0.01+ 
  (0.36)  (0.22)  (0.43)  (0.16)  (0.73)  (0.32)  (0.01)  
Military expenditure (relative) -1.93  14.50+  17.32  -8.64  -19.25  23.14+  -0.12  
(13.15)  (8.05)  (15.75)  (5.79)  (26.84)  (11.48)  (0.18)  
% military in GDP 0.63  6.98+  7.00  -3.41  -6.37  10.39+  -0.07  
  (6.80)  (3.93)  (8.15)  (2.83)  (13.88)  (5.61)  (0.07)  
GDP (relative) -11.11  -33.01**  -2.19  13.27+ -8.92  -46.28**  0.19  
  (15.75)  (10.35)  (18.87)  (7.44)  (32.16)  (14.76)  (0.20)  
China’s import from the country -2.56  -6.45*  7.68  1.36  -10.25  -7.81+  0.01  
(4.70)  (2.88)  (5.63)  (2.07)  (9.59)  (4.10)  (0.06)  
China’s export to the country -11.80+ -24.62*** 7.69  10.25*  -19.49  -34.87***  0.02  
(6.00)  (6.25)  (7.19)  (4.49)  (12.25)  (8.91)  (0.10)  
% of trade with China in total trade 127.01  342.18** -176.45  -111.35 303.47  453.53**  0.03  
(137.38) (99.26)  (164.59) (71.36) (280.46)  (141.58)  (2.06)  
China’s import > China’s export 
9.74  4.88  -15.00  4.28  24.74  0.60  0.18  
(8.11)  (6.55)  (9.72)  (4.71)  (16.56)  (9.34)  (0.17)  
Export competition -14.31  -0.50  -1.21  8.48  -13.11  -8.98  -1.19** 
 (20.45)  (16.49)  (24.50)  (11.86) (41.74)  (23.53)  (0.34)  
N 43  50  43  50  43  50  52  
F 3.98**  3.22**  3.02**  7.55*** 3.80** 5.80***  3.17** 
Adjusted R Square 0.57  0.46  0.48  0.72  0.56  0.65  0.45  
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression (standard errors in parentheses).    
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; +p< 0.1 (two-tailed test).   
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“Tourism” and “Democracy” have relatively strong impacts on China’s image, for 
both of them yield at least three significant coefficients with consistent sign to the 
hypothesis. In a country where there are more tourists visiting China, more people rate 
China’s global influence as positive. Tourism also helps to increase the percentage of 
favorable opinion and reduce the percentage of unfavorable opinion of China. In 
contrast, “Democracy” seems to be a constraint on China’s soft power. A democratic 
country tends to have unfavorable opinion of China while non-democratic countries 
have better attitudes towards China. The results also suggest that similar political 
value generates good impressions while different political value generates bad 
impressions among countries.  
 
“Confucianism” has a strong impact on China’s image as it yields 5 significant 
coefficients in the models. However, the signs are consistently in the opposite 
direction to the hypothesis. The countries in the “Confucian cultural circle” seem to 
have worse impressions of China: there are less favorable opinion and more 
unfavorable opinion, as well as a smaller percentage of people consider China’s 
influence to be positive.  
 
“Confucius Institute”, “Education”, “IO participation” and “Foreign aid” do not have 
any significant coefficient for all models.  Their impacts are yet to be observed.  
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4-3-2 Hard Power Variables in the Full Models 
For hard power resources, nine out of ten variables yield significant coefficients at 
least in one model, and among them three variables, namely “Highest MID”, “Dispute 
times” and “Export competition” have coefficients of the same sign as the hypothesis.  
 
In the military aspect, “Highest MID” shows a minor impact on China’s image. More 
respondents think China has a negative influence in the world in a surveyed country if 
the militarized disputes level between this country and China is high. “Dispute times” 
shows a similar pattern and a much greater impact as it has significant coefficients 
among three datasets. A country tends to have more favorable opinion of China and 
consider China’s global influence as positive if it had fewer disputes with China in 
history. The sign of the coefficients for “Military expenditure (relative)” indicates that 
a country with a relatively weak military power in terms of low military spending 
rates China’s influence to be positive. Meanwhile, “% military expenditure in GDP” 
seems to indicate that a country with higher percentage of military spending in its 
GDP considers China’s influence in the world more positive.  
 
In the economic aspect, the hypothesis or the expected sign of the coefficients are not 
as clear as the military and soft power variables. There are contending interpretations 
and debates on the impact of China’s economic strength and bilateral trade, whether it 
is a threat or an opportunity to other countries, thus China’s economic performance 
might improve or impair China’s national image. “Export competition” may be the 
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only variable that reaches a consensus: a country should have a negative view of 
China if the export competition between them is high. The results support this 
hypothesis with weak evidence, given only one significant coefficient in the pooled 
dataset. 
 
China’s economic power over the country, measured by the difference between 
China’s GDP and the surveyed country’s GDP, shows a negative impact on China’s 
image in PIPA datasets. A richer country (i.e. China’s economic power is weaker 
compared to that country) seems to think positively of China’s influence in the world.  
 
China’s imports from a country have a negative impact on China’s image. The more 
China imports from a country, the less people from that country consider China’s 
global influence as positive. Similarly, China’s exports to a country impair China’s 
image but to a greater extent. The more China exports to a country, the less people in 
that country have favorable opinion and rate positive influence for China. 
Interestingly, if we calculate the weight of the bilateral trade with China in the 
country’s total foreign trade, the trade relation becomes a positive factor for China’s 
image: a country views China’s influence in the world more positive if its trade with 
China takes up a higher percentage in its foreign trade. Surplus or deficit in the 
bilateral trade, measured by “China’s import>China’s export”, has little impact on 
China’s image, as none of its coefficient is significant. Export competition shows a 
weak negative impact as there is only one significant coefficient in the pooled dataset. 
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The chance is lower for a country to have warm feeling towards China if its export 
structure is similar to China’s.  
 
4-4 Comparing the Models 
The soft power model tells the impact of each soft power resource, without 
controlling the hard power variables. The full model tells the impact of each 
individual soft power resource after controlling the hard power variables, but it does 
not tell the collective impact of all the soft power resources. Do the soft power 
variables as a whole have an impact on the dependent variables? Do China’s soft 
power resources have a distinct contribution or a unique influence to China’s national 
image? To answer these questions, we need to detect the joint effect of China’s soft 
power variables, thus we compare the hard power model and the full model, by 
conducting an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test, to see how different the results are 
for a model without soft power variables (i.e. the hard power model) and a model with 
soft power variables (i.e. the full model). If these two models are significantly 
different, we can conclude that adding the soft power variables does strengthen the 
model fit and its predictive power. Therefore, China’s soft power resources as a whole 
do have some impact on China’s image. If these two models are indistinguishable 
statistically, it suggests that China’s soft power resources have little impact on China’s 
image, and China’s hard power resources are sufficient to explain the variances in 
China’s image in different countries. In other words, China’s national image is purely 
influenced by its hard power resources rather than its soft power resources.  
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Table 4-4 shows the comparison of the hard power model and the full model. The R 
square change, the F change and its significance level indicate that these two models 
are different in most of the comparison. For the PEW dataset, more than 33% of the 
variances in the dependent variables are due to the variances in the soft power 
variables, as shown in the R square change. The significance level of F change 
reaches at least 0.05. In the PIPA dataset, soft power variables have less unique 
impacts, with an average R square change of 0.13, and two out of three significant F 
change. In the pooled dataset, soft power variables have little impact on explaining the 
variances of the dependent variables.  
           
 Table 4-4 ANOVA Test for the Joint Effect of the Soft Power Variables 
( comparing hard power model and the full model) 
   R Square 
Change 
F Change Sig. F Change 
 positive PEW 0.333  3.644  0.006  
   PIPA 0.209  2.121  0.059  
 negative PEW 0.331  2.958  0.017  
   PIPA 0.077  1.484  0.199  
 net positive PEW 0.347  3.667  0.006  
  PIPA 0.119  1.847  0.100  
  pooled 0.094  0.964  0.487  
           
 
From the results we can see that the hard power model and the full model are different 
in most comparisons. The soft power variables as a whole have an impact on the 
dependent variables. China’s soft power resources have a distinct contribution to 
China’s national image. To be more specific, soft power resources show a greater 
impact in the PEW survey than the PIPA survey. Comparing the somewhat different 
 64
questions asked in these two surveys116, we can conclude that soft power resources 
have a great impact on people’s opinion of China, be it “favorable or unfavorable” (as 
the PEW survey asked) and some impact on China’s influence in the world, be it 
“mainly positive or mainly negative” (as the PIPA survey asked).  
 
4-5 Comparing the Coefficients of the Soft Power Variables 
The previous section assesses the joint effect of China’s soft power resources on 
China’s national image, and concludes that the effect does exist. This section explores 
further to see the impact of each individual soft power resource on China’s image by 
comparing the coefficients in different models117. Our purpose is to find out the 
change of the coefficients for each soft power variable after controlling the effect of 
hard power variables, so we compare the soft power model (i.e. the model with soft 
power variables only) and the full model (i.e. the model with both soft power and hard 
power variables). Specifically, for each independent variable, we compare the 
coefficients by examining the change of the sign, the significance level, and the 
absolute value of the standardized coefficient. A change of the sign for a coefficient 
tells that the variable plays a different role in influencing China’s image. It may shift 
from being a positive factor (i.e. improve China’ image) to a negative factor (i.e. 
impair China’s image) or vice versa. The significance level and the absolute value of 
the standardized coefficient indicate the predictive power for the variables. A high 
                                                        
116 PEW survey asks “Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or 
very unfavorable opinion of China”. PIPA survey asks “Please tell me if you think each of the following… 
(China) are having a mainly positive or mainly negative influence in the world”.  
117 See Table 4-5 Comparing the Standardized Coefficients of the Soft Power Variables in the Soft Power Model 
and the Full Model.  
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significance level and large absolute value of the standardized coefficient signify a 
powerful predictor and thus an important factor to shape China’s national image. To 
sum up, for each coefficient, the change of the sign indicates a change of the nature 
for this independent variable, while the change of the significance level and the 
absolute value indicate a change of the degree of its impact that this independent 
variable has on the dependent variables. 
 
Table 4-5 Comparing the Standardized Coefficients of the Soft Power Variables in the Soft Power Model and the Full Model 
    Positive Negative Net positive 
   PEW PIPA PEW PIPA PEW PIPA pooled 
Tradition 
  
soft power model -0.05  0.14  -0.05  -0.36**  0.00  0.28*  0.08 
full model 0.00  -0.04  -0.21  -0.25*  0.11  0.12  0.09 
Confucianism 
  
soft power model -0.51**  -0.11  0.62**  -0.08  -0.59**  -0.02  0.13 
full model -0.47+  -0.47*  0.69*  0.14  -0.61*  -0.35+  -0.01 
Cultural products soft power model -0.27  -0.14  0.00  -0.28  -0.14  0.08  0.40 
full model -0.02  0.35  -0.15  -0.47*  0.07  0.46+  0.19 
Confucius Institute soft power model -0.25  -0.04  0.14  0.21+  -0.20  -0.14  -0.40* 
full model -0.15  -0.03  0.09  0.15  -0.13  -0.10  0.11 
Education soft power model 0.32  -0.21  -0.19  0.36  0.26  -0.32  0.11 
  full model -0.48  -0.04  0.68  0.04  -0.61  -0.04  0.00 
Tourism soft power model 0.72+  0.22  -0.45  0.73*  0.60  -0.29  -0.26 
  full model 1.85**  1.34**  -1.69*  -0.03  1.83**  0.78*  0.35 
Democracy soft power model -0.77***  -0.26  0.62**  0.12  -0.72***  -0.21  0.01 
  full model -0.88*  -0.21  0.77*  -0.08  -0.85*  -0.07  0.04 
IO participation soft power model -0.12  -0.04  0.10  -0.35+ -0.11  0.17  0.01 
full model 0.06  0.06  -0.34  0.04  0.21  0.01  0.09 
Foreign aid soft power model -0.07  0.05  0.14  -0.30**  -0.11  0.20  0.47** 
 full model -0.03  -0.19  0.11  0.01  -0.07  -0.11  0.08 
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; +p< 0.1 (two-tailed test). 
 
“Tradition” retains a positive effect on China’s image, but this effect loses some 
weight after adding the hard power variables: the significance level for the 
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coefficients drops and the absolute value of the standardized coefficient becomes 
smaller, meaning that its relative importance as a predictor decreases.  
 
“Confucianism” retains a negative effect on China’s image. Although the significance 
levels for the coefficients decrease, the number of significant coefficients increases. 
Its relative importance as a predictor also increases for most of the significant 
standardized coefficients raise their absolute value. 
 
“Cultural products” is the only variable that becomes significant in the full model 
from being non-significant in the soft power model. The increase in its absolute value 
of standardized coefficients indicates that it gains some weight in predicting the 
dependent variables after including the hard power independent variables.  
 
In contrast, “Confucius Institute”, “IO participation” and “Foreign aid” become 
non-significant factors after hard power variables are controlled. They seem to have 
little impact on China’s image with other variables being equal. 
 
“Tourism” has a mixed effect on China’s image in the soft power model for it 
generates more favorable opinion on the one hand, and invites perception of China’s 
negative global influence on the other hand. After adding the hard power variables, 
“Tourism” becomes a purely positive factor of China’s image. It helps to enhance the 
favorable opinion of China, and enhance the perception that China’s influence in the 
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world is positive. 
 
“Democracy” loses some degree of significance for the coefficients. However, its 
relative importance as a predictor increases, witnessed by the rise of the absolute 
value of the standardized coefficients. It remains a strong factor that impairs China’s 
image by inciting unfavorable opinions of China. 
 
“Education”, measured by the number of foreign students studying in China, remains 
a non-significant factor in all models. It seems to have little impact on China’s 
national image. 
 
4-6 Comparing the Coefficients of the Hard Power Variables 
The previous section discusses how the impact of soft power variables changes after 
adding the hard power variables. Using a similar comparative approach, this section 
aims to find out the changes of the coefficients for the hard power variables. However, 
our purpose is different: we are interested in the joint effect of the soft power variable 
on each hard power variable, rather than the changes of the hard power variables per 
se.  
 
Table 4-6 compares the standardized coefficients for each hard power variable in the 
hard power model and the full model. The sign for all significant coefficients remains 
the same, meaning that soft power variables do not change the nature of each hard 
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power variable: there is no shift from being a positive factor to being a negative factor 
for China’s image. However, we find some variables lose their mixed effect. The once 
complex effect that both improves and impairs China’s image becomes simple: it 
either improves or impairs China’s image.   
 
Table 4-6 Comparing the Standardized Coefficients of the Hard Power Variables in the Hard Power Model and the Full Model 
  Positive Negative Net positive 
  PEW PIPA PEW PIPA PEW PIPA pooled 
Highest MID 
  
hard power model 0.09  0.31+  0.02  0.21+  0.04  0.06  -0.13  
full model -0.04  -0.14  0.33  0.43+  -0.20  -0.32  -0.21  
Dispute times 
  
hard power model -0.11  -0.30*  0.17  -0.16  -0.15  -0.08  -0.10  
full model -0.99*  -0.70**  0.90+  -0.06  -0.98*  -0.36*  -0.36+  
Military expenditure (relative) hard power model -1.55  0.92  2.63*  -1.32*  -2.18+  1.25+  -0.62  
full model -0.23  2.02+  1.88  -1.22  -1.13  1.83+  -0.55  
% military in GDP hard power model -0.42  0.32  0.69*  -0.42*  -0.58+  0.41+  -0.41  
full model 0.06  0.71+  0.61  -0.35  -0.30  0.60+  -0.33  
GDP (relative) hard power model 1.57  -1.90*  -2.24+  1.31+  1.99  -1.80*  0.88  
  full model -1.36  -4.24**  -0.25  1.72+  -0.54  -3.36**  0.85  
China’s import from the country hard power model -0.26  -0.68+  0.27  0.32  -0.27  -0.56*  0.07  
full model -0.41  -0.97*  1.15  0.21  -0.82  -0.67+  0.08  
China’s export to the country hard power model 0.26  -0.74+  -0.01  0.37  0.14  -0.62+  0.36  
full model -1.32+ -2.85***  0.80  1.20*  -1.09  -2.28***  0.09  
% of trade with China in total trade hard power model 0.06  0.42*  -0.01  -0.21+  0.04  0.36**  0.12  
full model 0.41  0.98**  -0.52  -0.32  0.49  0.73**  0.00  
China’s import > China’s export hard power model 0.12  0.16  -0.10  0.05  0.12  0.06  0.17  
full model 0.25  0.16  -0.35  0.14  0.31  0.01  0.18  
Export competition hard power model -0.53** -0.49**  0.58***  0.24*  -0.58***  -0.41**  -0.65***  
full model -0.18  -0.01  -0.01  0.14  -0.08  -0.08  -0.71**  
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; +p< 0.1 (two-tailed test).  
 
The most dramatic change in significance level goes to “Dispute times” and “Export 
competition”. “Dispute times” gains more significant coefficients after including the 
soft power variables. In contrast, “Export competition” loses almost all significant 
coefficients. Controlling the soft power variables, “Dispute times” has a greater 
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negative impact on China’s national image, while “Export competition”, a seemingly 
strong factor that impairs China’s image, becomes much less influential or even 
negligible.  
 
After controlling the soft power variables, the mixed effect of “Highest MID”, 
“Military expenditure (relative)”  “% military in GDP” and “GDP (relative)” 
becomes simplex. “Highest MID” shows a negative impact on China’s image. 
“Military expenditure (relative)” shapes the perception of China’s influence in the 
world: a country with low military spending rates China’s influence to be positive. It 
does not affect people’s favorable or unfavorable opinion of China any more. 
Similarly, “% military in GDP” becomes irrelevant to people’s favorable or 
unfavorable opinion of China after controlling the soft power variables. It only affects 
people’s perception of China’s global influence: a country with higher percentage of 
military spending in its GDP considers China’s influence in the world more positive. 
China’s economic power over the country, measured by “GDP (relative)”, used to be a 
negative factor for China’s global influence and a positive factor for China’s 
favorability among the respondents in the hard power model. After adding the soft 
power variables, it only affects China’s global influence: a poor country (i.e. China’s 
economic power is strong compared to that country) seems to consider China’s 
influence in the world as mainly negative. 
 
The effect of China’s trade relations with the surveyed country remains unchanged in 
 70
nature. China’ imports and exports still have negative impacts on China’s image, 
while a high percentage of trade with China in the country’s total trade improves 
China’s image as more respondents in that country agree that China has a mainly 
positive influence in the world. The trade balance, i.e. whether China imports more 
from or exports more to the country, remains irrelevant to China’s image, as there are 
no significant coefficient for “China’s import>China’s export” in all models. 
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Chapter 5  Conclusion 
 
The previous chapters operationalize China’s soft power in terms of its resources and 
its outcome, and build several models to test the relationship between them. Do 
China’s soft power resources contribute to a positive image? Do China’s soft power 
resources play a more important role in shaping its image than China’s hard power 
resources do? What are the factors that influence China’s national image? This chapter 
aims to answer these questions by analyzing the research findings from theoretical 
and empirical perspectives, and discuss the implications for China’s national image 
building. 
 
5-1 Theoretical Findings 
5-1-1 The Relation between Resources and Outcome Should Not be Taken for 
Granted 
We start to analyze power from its two components: its resource and its outcome. The 
regression result supports the argument that resources may or may not be transferred 
to a desirable outcome. It depends on how resources are tapped. Resource itself does 
not have any value orientation: it can be good or bad, depending on how the power 
holder uses it, and depending on how the power receiver interprets the intention and 
outcome of the usage of the power.  
 
As Nye points out, “the effectiveness of any power resource depends on the 
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context.”118 “Having power resources does not guarantee that you will always get the 
outcome you want.”119 “Power resources cannot be judged without knowing the 
context.”120 Our findings further support this point. On the one hand, soft power 
resources do not necessarily contribute to a desirable outcome or improve China’s 
national image. Education that attracts foreign students to study in a country is 
considered to be one resource of this country’s soft power. However, our findings 
indicate that for China this resource fails to result in a desirable outcome: education 
did not improve China’s national image. Confucianism, one of the core values of 
Chinese culture, which Chinese people are proud of and willing to promote to other 
countries, is not necessarily accepted by other countries. The regression result 
suggests that Confucianism actually impairs China’s national image. On the other 
hand, some hard power resources do not lead to the expected negative outcome or 
impair China’s image. A trade deficit with China is often believed to be a negative 
factor for China’s image. A country that imports more from China than it exports to 
China is expected to have a less favorable impression of China. However, the 
regression result shows that the trade balance has little impact on China’s image. 
 
5-1-2 Definition Revisited 
Nye defined soft power as the ability to co-opt rather than coerce other countries to 
achieve its policy aim. To be qualified as “soft power”, the power resource should be 
non-material and the power outcome should be desirable. In that sense, China’s soft 
                                                        
118 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 12. 
119 Ibid., 3. 
120 Ibid., 4. 
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power should only include the power of tourism, tradition and cultural products. We 
could presume that each country’s soft power differs from one another. Strictly 
speaking, we could not talk about a country’s soft power without knowing whether the 
resource of this soft power could contribute to a desirable outcome. Thus it will be 
better and safer to talk about “soft power resources” that may or may not lead to a 
desirable outcome, rather than talk about “soft power” which needs more 
examination. 
 
5-2 Empirical Findings 
5-2-1 The Role of Soft Power Resources and Hard Power Resources in China’s 
Image Building 
5-2-1-1 Both Hard Power and Soft Power Resources Matter 
We do not observe that soft power variables or hard power variables dominate or 
prevail over the other. China’s national image is influenced by its hard power and soft 
power resources. Two ANOVA tests assess the joint effect of soft power variables and 
the joint effect of hard power variables by comparing different models. The result 
shown in Table 4-4 and Table 5-1 confirms that soft power resources and hard power 
resources do have their unique impacts on China’s image. By observing the value of R 
square change and F change, we may further conclude that soft power resources have 
a greater impact on China’s favorability among the respondents (shown in the PEW 
dataset), while hard power resources have a greater impact on China’s perceived 
influence in the world (shown in the PIPA dataset). 
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As China’s integration into the international community deepens, people in other 
countries have more access to know the real China, and they form their perception on 
a more comprehensive basis. Thus both material and non-material forms of power 
work to shape people’s attitudes towards China. 
 
5-2-1-2 Soft Power Resources Do Have a Unique Contribution to Influence 
China’s National Image 
First of all, by comparing the models with and without soft power variables, we 
conclude that soft power resources as a whole do have some joint effect on people’s 
opinion of China and their perception of China’s influence in the world.  
 
Furthermore, by controlling hard power variables, some soft power variables still 
have significant impacts on China’s image individually. A multiple regression has the 
value of indicating the unique contribution of each variable in explaining the variation 
of the dependent variables, holding other variables constant. As shown in the full 
model, after controlling China’s hard power variables, China’s soft power variables 
still have some significant coefficients. The variation of soft power resources in 
different countries does have a unique contribution to explain the variation of China’s 
image.  
 
5-2-1-3 Hard Power Resources Seem More Important in Affecting China’s 
National Image 
Although both soft power and hard power variables have significant impacts on the 
dependent variables, their impacts differ in the degree of explaining the variation of 
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the dependent variables. Hard power variables seem more powerful in predicting the 
dependent variables than soft power variables. First, the joint effect of hard power 
variables is stronger than the joint effect of soft power variables. Two ANOVA tests 
show that hard power variables render a higher level of significance for the F change 
and greater R square change than soft power variables do121. Second, comparing the 
nested model and the full model, more hard power variables remain significant than 
soft power variables. The soft power variables “Confucius Institute”, “IO 
participation”, and “Foreign aid” lose their significance in three datasets after 
controlling the hard power variables, while no hard power variables become 
non-significant in all datasets after controlling the soft power variables. To conclude, 
hard power resources seem more influential on China’s national image than soft 
power resources, both in terms of the joint effect and the effect of each individual 
resource. 
 
           
Table 5-1 ANOVA Test for the Joint Effect of the Hard Power Variables 
(Comparing soft power model and the full model)  
 
  
R Square 
Change 
F Change Sig. F Change  
positive PEW 0.214  2.114  0.067   
   PIPA 0.483  4.412  0.001  
negative PEW 0.259  2.082  0.071   
   PIPA 0.213  3.696  0.003  
net positive PEW 0.240  2.281  0.049   
 PIPA 0.373  5.233  0.000   
 pooled 0.347  3.196  0.006   
           
 
                                                        
121 See Table 4-4 ANOVA Test for the Joint Effect of the Soft Power Variables and Table 5-1 ANOVA Test for the 
Joint Effect of the Hard Power Variables. 
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5-2-2 Factors that Influence China’s Image 
5-2-2-1 Soft Power Factors 
From the full model we can see that some soft power resources improve China’s 
image, such as “Tourism”, “Tradition” and “Cultural products” while others impair 
China’s image, such as “Confucianism” and “Democracy”. Among all the soft power 
resources, “Tradition”, “Confucianism”, “Tourism” and “Democracy” have greater 
impacts than others on China’s image as they remain significant after controlling the 
hard power variables. (i.e. they are significant in both soft power model and the full 
model.) To be more specific, “Democracy” affects people’s opinion of China, while 
“Tradition” and “Cultural products” affect people’s perception of China’s influence in 
the world. “Confucianism” and “Tourism” affect both China’s favorability (i.e. 
people’s favorable and unfavorable opinion of China) and its perceived influence in 
the world. 
 
5-2-2-2 Hard Power Factors 
Besides soft power resources, we find some hard power resources that shape China’s 
image as well. From the full model we can see that “Military expenditure (relative)”, 
“% military expenditure in GDP” and “% trade with China in total trade” improve 
China’s image, while “Highest MID”, “Dispute times”, “GDP (relative)”, “China’s 
import from the country” “China’s export to the country” and “Export competition” 
impair China’s image. To be more specific, “Highest MID”, “Military expenditure 
(relative)”, “% military expenditure in GDP”, “GDP (relative)”, “China’s import from 
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the country” and “% trade with China in total trade” affect people’s perception of 
China’s influence in the world. “Dispute times” and “China’s export to the country” 
affect both China’s favorability (i.e. people’s favorable and unfavorable opinion of 
China) and its perceived influence in the world. 
 
5-2-2-3 Historical Factors 
Historical factors, or long term factors, play an important role in shaping China’s 
image. Among the nineteen independent variables, five independent variables, namely 
“Tradition”, “Confucianism”, “Democracy”, “Highest MID” and “Dispute times” are 
historical or long term factors. All of these factors have significant coefficients in both 
the nested models and the full models.122 China’s historical relationship with other 
countries greatly influences people’s impressions of modern China. An ANOVA test 
for the joint effect of these historical or long term factors shows significant F change 
with an average R square change of 23% in the PEW dataset.123 For the PIPA and the 
pooled dataset, only some of the F changes are significant. It means that these 
historical or long term factors have a stronger joint effect on China’s favorability 
measured by people’s favorable and unfavorable opinion of China, and a weak effect 
on China’s perceived global influence. Unfortunately, besides “Tradition”, these 
historical or long term factors are negative factors that impair China’s image. 
 
                                                        
Table 5-2 ANOVA Test for the Joint Effect of the Long Term Factors   
122 See Table 4-5 Comparing the Standardized Coefficients of the Soft Power Variables in the Soft Power Model 
and the Full Model and Table 4-6 Comparing the Standardized Coefficients of the Hard Power Variables in the 
Hard Power Model and the Full Model. 
123 See Table 5-2 ANOVA Test for the Joint Effect of the Long Term Factors.  
 78
 
  
R Square 
Change 
F Change Sig. F Change  
positive PEW 0.226  4.451  0.006   
  PIPA 0.194  3.536  0.012   
negative PEW 0.235  3.778  0.012   
  PIPA 0.048  1.665  0.173   
net positive PEW 0.240  4.567  0.005   
 PIPA 0.076  2.122  0.090   
 pooled 0.082  1.511  0.214   
           
 
5-3 Implications for China’s Image Building 
5-3-1 Historical Factors: Cannot Change? 
As discussed above, historical or long term factors play a significant role in 
influencing China’s national image. Historical factors, such as “Tradition”, 
“Confucianism”, “Highest MID level” and “Dispute times” cannot be changed. 
However, the degree of their impacts can be changed if handled properly. How the 
Chinese government transfers the historical glory into credit, and minimizes the 
destructive impact of the historical shadow is a challenge for China’s image 
improvement. 
 
China’s political system or political culture is acknowledged as a constraint for 
China’s soft power projection.124 “The authoritarian nature of the Chinese government, 
corruption, loose rule of law, and closed operation of the government are in deep 
conflict with the world’s dominant trend of democratization and proliferation of 
                                                        
124 Most of the studies on China’s soft power acknowledge this point. For example, Zhang, "Tapping Soft Power: 
Managing China's 'Peaceful Rise' and the Implications for the World."; Gill and Huang, "Sources and Limits of 
Chinese 'Soft Power'."; Huang and Ding, "Dragon's Underbelly: An Analysis of China's Soft Power." 
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liberal values.”125 Our findings further support this point: the variable “Democracy”, a 
long term and significant factor, impairs China’s image. Further reform towards a 
more democratic political system could improve China’s favorability among foreign 
countries. 
 
5-3-2 Cultural Products and Tourism: although Nascent but Already Work 
China’s export of cultural products helps to shape people’s view of China’s influence 
in the world. According to a report on international flows of selected cultural goods 
and services from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), “China started to be an important player in trade flows from 
the early 1990s. Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese trade balance has become positive. 
It is also the case for core cultural goods; China is a net exporter with US$ 5.8 billion 
in exports but only US$1.2 billion in imports.”126  In 2002, China ranked No. 4 in 
total core cultural goods export in the world. In terms of export value, it ranked No. 1 
in audiovisual media, No. 2 in visual arts, No. 7 in books, No. 7 in other printed 
matter, and No. 14 in recorded media.127  
 
Tourism wins credit for China’s image building. According to Country Brand Index 
2005 that studies the global tourism industry, China ranks No. 1 for “most improved 
country brands” and “rising star country brand”. It is in the top ten of the best country 
                                                        
125 Ibid. 122.   
126 "International Flows of Selected Cultural Goods and Services, 1994-2003," UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/template/pdf/cscl/IntlFlows_EN.pdf (Accessed 2007-11-29) 30. 
127 Ibid. See Annex I, Table V “Top 20 importers and exporters for the main core cultural goods categories”. 
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brands for “art and culture”, “history”, “convention” and “business”.128  
 
5-3-3 Language and Education: No Impact Yet 
Chinese language and education attractiveness are growing in recent years, as the 
numbers of foreign students and Chinese language learners increase rapidly. However, 
the regression result does not show any positive impact of these two soft power 
resources on China’s image. One possibility is that this impact takes time to be seen. 
We could only see the expected positive impact in the long run. Another possibility 
may be due to the relative low quality of education that doesn’t satisfy the foreign 
students or meet their expectations. It may be equally true that foreign students come 
to China just for economic concerns. The fact that they are attracted by the potential 
economic benefit may not result in an improved opinion of China. 
 
5-3-4 International Organization Participation: from Passive to Active 
Our finding suggests that international organization participation does not improve 
China’s national image. Although China participates in quite a few international 
organizations129, it does not play an active and constructive role in most of the 
organizations. China’s involvement in agenda setting, providing public goods and 
other initiatives is quite limited. This passive participation does not improve China’s 
national image. China should make use of international organization as a multilateral 
                                                        
128 "Country Brand Index," FutureBrand, http://www.countrybrandindex.com/resources/pdf/cbi-2005.pdf. 
(Accessed 2006-11-21). 
129 According to US CIA the World Factbook, China took part in 66 international organizations in 2004, 2005 and 
2006.  
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platform to be a “responsible power”. Otherwise international organization 
participation could not help to improve China’s image.  
 
5-3-5 Foreign Aid: Who Benefits? 
Foreign aid has little contribution to a positive image for China. “China has developed 
a substantial aid program. From almost nothing in the mid-1990s, Chinese aid now 
can compete with American aid programs in parts of Southeast Asia, Latin America, 
and Africa.”130 China’s aid has not only grown but also become more sophisticated.131 
However, our regression result indicates that foreign aid has little contribution to 
improving China’s image. One possible reason is that China promises much more 
than it can deliver. “Still a developing country, China could overplay its hand, making 
promises to other nations that it cannot fulfill.” “Indeed, after Chinese leaders make 
promises of new aid during visits overseas, Beijing sometimes fails to follow through 
with the cash.”132 “China’s promises of aid and investment could take years to 
materialize, yet Beijing has created heightened expectations about its potential as a 
donor and investor in many countries.”133 Not fulfilling the aid promise will destroy 
China’s credibility, thus impairing China’s image greatly. 
 
Another reason lies in the recipient countries. The aid may not benefit the people if 
the recipient country has a corrupt government. What’s worse, “China’s aid policies 
                                                        
130 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World. 97. 
131 Ibid., 101. 
132 Ibid., 98-99. 
133 Ibid., 230. 
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could undermine efforts by Western governments and international financial 
institutions to demand better governance and environmental regulation from aid 
recipients.”134 Take Angola for example. “International corruption watchdogs warn 
that the Chinese assistance, given with no conditions, will allow the Angolan 
government to revert to its old habits, skimming the petroleum cream for itself. 
Already Angola has backed off its EITI commitment and postponed a mission by the 
World Bank designed to teach the country about transparency.”135  Foreign aid could 
improve China’s image only if the aid benefits the people rather than sustains the 
corrupt government. 
 
5-3-6 Hard Power Resources: Angel or Devil? 
The hard power variables show a more complex pattern. Measured by different 
criteria, China’s hard power plays different roles. We cannot conclude that in general 
China’s hard power resources improve or impair China’s national image. In the aspect 
of military power, a country with low military spending rates China’s influence to be 
positive. On the other hand, a country which spends more of its GDP in military 
expenditure regards China’s influence to be positive. In the trade aspect, China’s 
influence is viewed more positively by the country that imports less from or exports 
less to China. Bilateral trade, in terms of dollar value, seems to impair China’s image. 
However, if China is an important trade partner to a country as indicated by a high 
percentage of the bilateral trade with China in that country’s total trade, this trade 
                                                        
134 Ibid., 171. 
135 Ibid., 174. 
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impact is a positive factor and improves China’s image. Other trade impacts, 
commonly believed to be positive or negative, such as having a trade surplus or 
deficit with China, and how fierce the export competition is with China136, actually 
show little or no impact on China’s image. To improve China’s national image, 
conventional wisdom on the role of material power may not hold. Subtle military and 
economic policies from further studies are needed. 
 
To sum up, China’s national image is influenced by both its hard power resources and 
soft power resources. China’s soft power resources do work to affect its image, 
although to a lesser degree compared to its hard power. “Tradition”, “Cultural 
products”, “Tourism”, “Military expenditure (relative)”, “% military expenditure in 
GDP” and “% trade with China in total trade” improve China’s image while 
“Confucianism”, “Democracy”, “Highest MID”, “Dispute times”, “GDP (relative)”, 
“China’s import from the country”, “China’s export to the country” and “Export 
competition” impair China’s image. The findings suggest that proper handling of the 
historical factors, a reform towards a more democratic political system, promotion of 
its cultural products export and inbound tourism, more active participation in the 
international organizations, effective aid programs that benefit the people and subtle 
policy to deal with the impact of material power should be on the agenda for China’s 
image building. 
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Appendix 1 Independent variable description 
Soft Power Variables 
Independent variable Measurement Source 
scores 1 if the country was in Chinese 
tribute system in history, or had ever 
pay tribute the Chinese empires, and 
scores 0 if it was not.  
Li, Yunquan. History of 
Tribute System: A Study 
of Ancient China’s 
Foreign Relations. 
Beijing: Xinhua Press, 
2004. 
Tradition 
2 for the countries within the 
“Confucian cultural circle” which had 
been influenced deeply by 
Confucianism; 1 for the countries 
within the “Confucian cultural circle” 
but had been influenced by 
Confucianism less than those scoring 
2; 0 for those countries outside the 
“Confucian cultural circle” 
Confucianism and 
Modern Society. Edited 
by Chengxuan He and 
Suping Li. Shenyang: 
Shenyang Press, 2001. 
Confucianism 
Cultural products China’s cultural products export to 
the country, in million US dollars, in 
natural logarithm term. Includes: 
books, newspaper/journal, music, 
works of art/antiques 
United Nation 
Commodity Trade 
Statistics Database 
Confucius Institute Number of Confucius Institute in the 
country 
Confucius Institute 
Division, The Office of 
Chinese Language 
Council International 
Number of foreign student from a 
country to study in China, in natural 
logarithm term 
China’s Foreign Affairs Education 
Number of tourist from a country, in 
natural logarithm term 
Yearbook of Chinese 
foreign economic 
statistics 
Tourism 
Democracy 1 if the country’s democracy score is 
greater than 5, 0 otherwise  
Polity IV Country 
Report. 2003 
IO participation the number of international 
organizations that both China and a 
country take part in 
CIA: The World 
Factbook 
Foreign aid 1 if China gave foreign aid to the 
country, 0 otherwise  
China Commerce 
Yearbook 
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Hard Power Variables 
Independent variable Measurement Source 
Military expenditure 
(relative) 
China’s military expenditure minus that 
country’s military expenditure, in million US 
dollars, in natural logarithm term, i.e. 
ln(China’s military expenditure)-ln(the 
country’s military expenditure) 
SIPRI military 
expenditure 
database 
% military in GDP the percentage of military expenditure in GDP 
Highest MID the highest hostility level in dispute (5 being 
the highest) 
COW. 
Militarized 
Interstate 
Disputes 
Dispute times the times of disputes between China and a 
country during 1816 and 2001 
GDP (relative) China’s GDP minus the country’s GDP,  in 
million US dollars, in natural logarithm term, 
i.e. ln(China’s GDP)-ln(the country’s GDP) 
International 
Monetary Fund 
(IMF), 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
China’s import from the 
country 
China’s import from the country, in million 
US dollars, in natural logarithm term 
China’s export to the 
country 
China’s export to the country to the country, 
in million US dollars, in natural logarithm 
term 
% of trade with China 
in total trade 
the percentage of trade with China as the 
country’s total foreign trade 
China’s import>China’s 
export 
1 if China’s import is greater than its export to 
the country, and 0 if China’s export is greater 
than its import from that country. 
Export competition coefficient of specialization: the greater the 
value is, the greater export competition 
between China and the country 
Calculated by the 
author, data from 
United Nation 
Commodity 
Trade Statistics 
Database 
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Appendix 2 Dependent variable description 
Dependent variable Measurement Source 
Positive (PIPA) % of “mainly positive” Program on International Policy Attitudes 
(PIPA): “Please tell me if you think each 
of the following are having a mainly 
positive or mainly negative influence in 
the world . . . China [Mainly 
positive/Mainly 
negative/Depends/Neither, no 
difference/DK/NA].” 79 observations in 
2004,2005 and 2006 
Negative (PIPA) % of “mainly negative” 
Net positive (PIPA) % of “mainly positive” 
minus % of “mainly 
negative” 
Positive (PEW) % of “very 
favorable/somewhat 
favorable” 
Pew Global Attitudes Project (PEW): 
“Please tell me if you have a very 
favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat 
unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion 
of China.” 76 observations in 2005, 2006 
and 2007. 
Negative (PEW) % of “somewhat 
unfavorable/very 
unfavorable” 
Net positive (PEW) % of “very 
favorable/somewhat 
favorable” minus % of 
“somewhat unfavorable/very 
unfavorable” 
Net positive (pooled) % of positive survey results 
in all the surveys a country 
had. 
Calculated by the author. The surveys 
include: Transatlantic Trends, PIPA, Pew, 
AsiaBarometer, East Asia Barometer. 68 
countries being surveyed. 
 
